Paul Krugman vs Steve Moore

Live from Freedomfest in Las Vegas, a debate between Paul Krugman and Steve Moore. The official title is, “How can we restore the American Dream?” which, no doubt, will enter into the issue of economic management and Keynesian theory. We shall see. This is a live blog.

First question, why are we struggling?

K: Worst financial crisis – cut public spending too soon. Lots of wealth created but not much trickling down. Income inequality is a problem.

M: Agrees with K over the level of intervention. Bailouts were a mistake. Stimulus did not create jobs. Obamacare a mistake. Lots of problems. We had a Keynesian experiment that did not work. Reagan v Obama; Reagan turned out well. Obama thought the govt was the solution.

K: Problem for Reagan was inflation. Obama problem was a slowdown in activity. Different problem. If that’s your best answer, you have no answer. Stimulus v austerity you can see a strong positive correlation between spending and growth. The Obama stimulus was not huge; about 2% of GDP at its max. Wasn’t enough. Needed more as often stated.

M: Economists on the left used the Keynesian playbook, and it happened and it did not make a dent in our unemployment. Would more have been better. No one believes that. Reagan was also dealing with a recession. Tax cuts led to a recovery. Obama policies did not work according even to their own estimates.

K: Obama’s predictions was not my prediction. Aftermath of financial crisis is always slow. There is only a few times we need govt intervention. The Reagan policy was one when you did not need one. In 2008-09 we did.

Q: Is the private sector being stifled by excessive regulation?

K: Obamacare is a hybrid. Working quite well. Would like to have a single-payer system. Private companies are the conduit. Bad process. Has turned out to be cheaper than expected. Not blowing a hole in the budget. Repealing Obamacare would lead to a blow out in the budget.

M: Education and healthcare are govt dominated and that is where the costs have risen the most. Third party payments drive up costs. Premiums are blowing out. What about the tax on medical devices?

K: Healthcare costs rise because of innovation. Therefore costs go up. Everywhere else has lower costs where there are national health care. Govt intervention is more efficient than private. Third party payments are a problem.

M: Competition missing.

K: No one goes comparison shopping after a heart attack.

Q: Labour participation rate is low – minimum wage laws. Should they go up?

K: A place I have changed my views. Raising the minimum wage a lot will cost jobs. However, cannot find evidence that higher minimum wages cost jobs. Happy with $15 per hour and if no impact then up to $20.

M: Mostly about kids who are being locked out. Sinister trend. How bout a teenage minimum wage?

K: No evidence that I can see. Re teenagers – I’m willing to think about it but I am against over-complexity of the legislation.

Q: Red State v Blue State job creation.

M: Red State have more free market policies and more employment growth. Lower taxes in red states. Less regulation.

K: Red State employment growth better than in Blue State. What determines who grows faster? Warm winters! Air conditioning is changing employment patterns. The one policy that makes the difference is land use policy. Restrictive land use policies raise housing costs. The factors that matter are:

. weather
. land use policy

Regulation doesn’t matter as much.

M: What about the policies?

K: People like to live where they can buy houses.

M: What about Greece?

K: Advocate of a strong social safety net. Not a big government guy. Govts do a terrible job with the steel industry or the post office.

Q: Favourite economist: Smith, Keynes or Marx?

K: No brief for Marx. Favourite economists Smith AND Keynes. Must sometimes protect the public interest through regulation. With Keynes understand why economies go off.

M: JEL article on The Age of Milton Friedman. My problem is that we live in the Age of Keynes. When have they ever worked?

Q: Welfare Reform Act. Should we attempt to lower welfare.

K: Dispute the premiss. No upward trend in welfare dependancy until the GFC. Then the worst slump and the safety net programs. Alleviated some of the worst suffering. We are not creating a welfare class. You may want to believe it but it’s not true.

M: Post 1996 Welfare Reform Act number of people on welfare fell.

K: Not hardline against welfare reform. Now we have no system for providing income. I think of this as fairly trivial. Food stamps and Medicaid both work and don’t see much need of change.

Q: What three policies would you advocate to restore the American dream? How about privatisation of social security and education.

K: 1) Land use restrictions need to be reduced. Cheaper housing needed.
2) Program to promote equality. Born into a lower class family will reduce future income.
3) Empowering workers, with minimum wage at the start. Increase the bargaining power of unions.

M: Need to help the middle class. And unions contaminate everything they touch.
1) Voucher to every child in the country to promote advantage.
2) Ownership of their own companies.
3) 16-17% flat tax rate.

End discussion. Questions from the floor.

Q: Why health care costs going up and benefits going down?

K: Obamacare has been a lifesaver for certain people. Some people are paying more, but overwhelmingly the effect has been positive.

M: Republicans will change the system. Need more choice.

Q: Debt and deficits

K: Debt levels and growth high correlation, but what is the causation? Debt levels should not be a preoccupation. High debt without one’s own currency is a problem. We are many many percentage points away from a maximum load and it is falling.

M: Depends on what you buy with the debt. Should use debt to finance lower taxes. Low interest rates is what is keeping the country going.

K: The private sector was deleveridging. The lack of spending is why we have a recession. If everyone is cutting back to retain income where will the demand come from? The deficits saved the world from a great depression. Compared with what happens in your ordinary financial crisis, the GFC was not bad.

M: Obama recovery was the worst post-war recovery.

Keynesian policy in the United States

july 4 washington

In Washington, and went to the Mall last night for the fireworks. The best fireworks display I have ever seen, the sky was at the end entirely covered with colour and sound. They were even able to send up in the middle of it a set of rockets that, when they burst, spelled out “USA”. But the very few chants of “USA” also died away as quickly as the fireworks. There’s too much reality around at the moment.

As to reality, there is, of course, this:

Even after another month of strong hiring in June and a sinking unemployment rate, the U.S. job market just isn’t what it used to be.

Pay is sluggish. Many part-timers can’t find full-time work. And a diminished share of Americans either have a job or are looking for one.

The rest of the article is fumbling idiocy as the journalist tries to explain away the actual reality of the American labour market. You need to contrast this great Keynesian disaster with the last time a classical policy was applied in the US.

Beginning in January 1920, something much worse than a recession blighted the world. The U.S. suffered the steepest plunge in wholesale prices in its history (not even eclipsed by the Great Depression), as well as a 31.6% drop in industrial production and a 46.6% fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Unemployment spiked, and corporate profits plunged.

What to do? “Nothing” was the substantive response of the successive administrations of Woodrow Wilson and Warren G. Harding. Well, not quite nothing. Rather, they did what few 21st-century policy makers would have dared: They balanced the federal budget and—via the still wet-behind-the-ears Federal Reserve—raised interest rates rather than lowering them. Curiously, the depression ran its course. Eighteen months elapsed from business-cycle peak to business-cycle trough—following which the 1920s roared.

At the end of my Say’s Law presentation to the Keynesian symposium I attended at Dartmouth I was asked to explain why a classical policy works, which it does. And the fact is, the presuppositions are so different that it is almost impossible to latch onto the differences. If these things interest you – and I am all too aware how few actually, really are – go to my lead article at the Liberty Fund and carefully read the section that deals with the diagram I have there. There you will find macroeconomics before Keynes summarised in less than 1000 words. This is the theory that sat under the policies of the early 1920s. Hoover, and then Roosevelt in spades, a decade later would introduce “Keynesian” policies, the first of many such failures in a policy that has never had a success.

Hiding the decline in employment

Here’s a story I wouldn’t normally have looked at, Hillary Clinton to campaign in Hanover Friday, but seeing I will be in Hanover on Friday, am there now, it sprang off the page. More detail:

Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton will visit Hanover this afternoon at 12:30 p.m. and speak at a “grassroots organization event,” according to Clinton’s campaign website.

This is not, need I point out, Hanover in Germany, but Hanover in New Hampshire, where may be found the campus of Dartmouth University. I am here for a small symposium on Keynes, but was all set to abandon ship, except that this “grassroots” event is more like the “tallest poppies” event, in that it would cost thousands to get in the door. Will therefore stick to Keynes.

Which brings me to the latest news on the American economy, this from Drudge – and you will not find the first part of this anywhere near the front of The New York Times, or USA Today, but you will find the second.

Record 93,626,000 Not in Labor Force…
Unemployment rate drops to 5.3%…

Rush Limbaugh did a take on this today as well, where he discussed the disastrous labour market in the US, where the stats keep showing improvement despite the vast disappearance of jobs:

Twice as many people left the workforce in May as found jobs, which cancels out the 223,000 jobs created. If 223,000 jobs are created and 432,000 jobs were lost, would somebody explain to me where all this job creation is? Now, the AP and the rest of the Obama sycophant media is not telling you about the decline in the labor force. Some are talking about the labor force participation rate, and they’re relying on the fact that most in the low information category are not going to understand it. “Labor force participation, what’s that? It doesn’t matter to me, Mabel.” All they’re going to hear is the unemployment rate is 5.3%. (laughing)

I laugh too, but it’s not funny at all. But Obama has ramped up welfare so that people do not starve to death in the street, but the numbers are shocking.

And what’s it got to do with Keynes? Everything, alas, but where are the economists to point it out. They must be working at the bureau of stats in this massive effort to hide the decline.

I yam in the grate saten

In New York, in fact. The main purpose of my trip was originally to debate the author of a book called Seven Bad Ideas in Economics about Say’s Law, which was bad idea Number 2. The venue was to be at Freedomfest in Las Vegas. In the end, he decided discretion was the better part of valour, and so, I will be having that debate, with me taking both sides. As I tell everyone else, I will be having a one-man show in Vegas.

But other stops along the way as well, which mostly includes meeting and discussing authors I am bringing together in my Modern Critics of Keynes, of which there are hardly any. These are economists who have each already written extensive critiques of Keynesian economics. If you can think of more than two, you are doing well. I am happy to say that on a previous such appeal, I was given one name that will now appear and star in this volume. Given how few there are, this was a reason for serious gratitude.

Meantime, blogging will be lighter than usual.

The vast majority of economists are Keynesian

I will preface this with my own invention, the National Accounting Stimulus Trap, which is built around Y=C+I+G. An increase in public spending will, inevitably, show up as an increase in Y because that is how the accounts are designed. A fall in public spending will inevitably show up as a fall in Y, for exactly the same reason. If you think that the real effects of a change in policy can ever be detected in less than a year, you have to be blind to the basics.

Which brings me to a blog post by Simon Wren-Lewis, University of Oxford, with the title, The academic consensus on the impact of austerity. The consensus is negative; most economists are either Old or New Keynesians:

Unfortunately we do not have a great deal of information on what academic economists as a whole think about austerity, but we do have two important survey results which are pretty conclusive. In the US, there is the IFM Forum, which regularly asks a group of distinguished economists – including many macroeconomists – their views on key policy issues. The last poll I have seen suggests that 82% of that panel thought the 2009 Obama stimulus had reduced unemployment, while only 2% disagreed. In the UK, the CFM survey asked a similar question to a smaller group of academic economists, most of whom are macroeconomists. Only 15% agreed that the austerity policies of the coalition government have had a positive effect on aggregate economic activity, while 66% disagreed. That consensus is not universal – it would not apply in Germany for example – but I doubt if anyone would disagree when I say that US economists call the shots as far as academic macroeconomics is concerned.

This is why economists the world over continue to teach Keynesian macro to undergraduates, and normally not as one ‘school of thought’ but rather as an initial approximation of how the economy actually works. As Amartya Sen so forcefully reminds us, the experience of the last hundred years has earned Keynesian theory this central role.

There’s more of the same:

We have another, more indirect, source of evidence. If you asked whether there was a standard model for analysing the business cycle among economists in academia and in policy making institutions, the answer would have to be the New Keynesian model. I want to include economists in central banks in particular because they have to put theories of the business cycle into practice on a regular basis. The key macromodels that central banks use to forecast and to analyse policy are Keynesian, and many are New Keynesian. [his italics]

And I have to give you this, which is a jargon-filled sentence of such raw stupidity that it amazes me that anyone can write such a nauseating sentence with such smug certitude given how anaemic the American “recovery” has been:

This is why, among economists with expertise, there is a clear majority view that fiscal austerity is significantly contractionary in a liquidity trap.

No economy that has had a stimulus applied has recovered in any interesting sense. The business cycle is cyclical. Every downturn turns up. Nothing falls forever. But if you are going to call the present pathetic example of a recovery a serious upturn, I will merely point out that you have not got a clue.

For more of the same, go here.

The mystery of the Keynesian Revolution

Here is another book just published about the Keynes, this one, Reinterpreting The Keynesian Revolution by Robert Cord. This is what it’s about.

Various explanations have been put forward as to why the Keynesian Revolution in economics in the 1930s and 1940s took place. Some of these point to the temporal relevance of John Maynard Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), appearing, as it did, just a handful of years after the onset of the Great Depression, whilst others highlight the importance of more anecdotal evidence, such as Keynes’s close relations with the Cambridge ‘Circus’, a group of able, young Cambridge economists who dissected and assisted Keynes in developing crucial ideas in the years leading up to the General Theory.

However, no systematic effort has been made to bring together these and other factors to examine them from a sociology of science perspective. This book fills this gap by taking its cue from a well-established tradition of work from history of science studies devoted to identifying the intellectual, technical, institutional, psychological and financial factors which help to explain why certain research schools are successful and why others fail. This approach, it turns out, provides a coherent account of why the revolution in macroeconomics was ‘Keynesian’ and why, on a related note, Keynes was able to see off contemporary competitor theorists, notably Friedrich von Hayek and Michal Kalecki.

There are many reasons why it happened, but there is this for starters: if you say to kids that the best way to grow up strong and healthy is to eat lots of chocolate cake you will need to do very little convincing. You will actually ruin their health, but they won’t know that until they have tried it for themselves.

My own contribution to this issue of why Keynes with this theory at that time is to point out that Keynes was reading Malthus’s letters to Ricardo at the bottom of the Great Depression at the end of 1932 while preparing his “Essay on Malthus” for his Essays in Biography that was published at the start of 1933. And there, in the midst of Malthus’s letters, he discovered the general glut debate of the 1820s and Malthus’s arguments attributing recessions and unemployment to demand deficiency. So obvious is this sequence that it remains the most mysterious of all of the mysteries I have encountered in my dealing with Keynes and the Keynesians that not only do they not accept that reading Malthus had any effect on Keynes’s thinking, they will not even consider it as a possibility. But that’s how it happened, and the more evidence I have the more resolutely it is ignored. If you want to look at the sociology of science in relation to Keynes, that is where I would start.

When Adam Smith wrote on “the wealth of nations” what did he mean by “wealth”?

This was the initial query sent to the Societies for the History of Economic Thought discussion thread on June 16.

Dear colleagues,
I’m trying to trace the source of translating “economics” as “the science of wealth” (and sometimes “the science of the wealth of nations”) in late nineteenth-century Ottoman-Turkish. Ottoman economists most probably rendered it from French (“la science de la richesse”), from popular sources preceding the 1860s. I could find expressions like “l’économie politique est la science de la richesse” in many economic texts from the era, but I’m trying to understand how common it was to use “la science de la richesse” instead of or interchangeably with “l’économie politique” referring to the discipline itself.

What has followed has been a brief discourse that amounts to the statement from one of the French correspondents that “it is very easy to show that ‘science de la richesse‘ was a synonym of political economy in the first half of 19th century, not from ‘popular sources’ but just to explain the title of books.” I have therefore sent my own brief contribution along, because I do think that words make a very great deal of difference in how we think and what we are able to understand.

It has seemed to me for a while that the title, The Wealth of Nations, is an eighteenth century use of words and is somewhat misleading as to the point that Smith was making. I have tried to find a modern phrase that would capture what he meant, and the closest I have been able to come to is: The Prosperity of Nations. “Wealth” has a kind of treasure chest notion to it (which it may not have had back then), and the word “wealthy” is tied to personal riches, which is not at all, I think, what Smith was trying to get at. So when I read that the French for “wealth” is “richesse“, or that my google translator turns “The Wealth of Nations” into “la richesse des nations“, I really do therefore wonder how much has been lost in translation. Because when I translate the English word “riches” into French, it gives me “richesse” once again. The alternative French to English of “richesse” are “wealth”, “richness”, “riches”, “rich” and “affluent”. And for the French word “riche” we get these English translations: “rich”, “wealthy”, “affluent”, “opulent”, “splendid” and “luxurious”. Each of them seem totally inadequate to making sense of what Smith had in mind or what the book is about. This seems to me more than just a curiosity.

Adam Smith on Say’s Law

The actual mechanism of exchange that is often mistaken for Say’s Law is the statement that demand is constituted by supply. Purchases are made with the money one has received from producing and selling. How odd that I had never noticed this in Adam Smith before where he writes exactly that. This is from the Introduction to Book II, “On the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock”:

When the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the produce of a man’s own labour can supply but a very small part of his occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce of other men’s labour, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the same thing, with the price of the produce of his own. But this purchase cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own labour has not only been completed, but sold.

Ah those two words, “but sold”. It’s not enough to produce something. Whatever one has produced must be then be converted into money before one can then buy something else: C-M-C’.

Smith also goes further in that same intro by discussing the role of the entrepreneur in finding value adding forms of work for employees who could not do so on their own. This is where Keynesian economics breaks down in the belief that a community can spend its money before it is earned. Perhaps an individual can, but not everyone together. In the passage below, the stock held by the employer would today basically consist of those lines of credit that allow employers to pay their workers before the goods they are producing find buyers. That stock must exist if individuals are to receive the goods they then purchase with their wages:

As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this great improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumulation naturally leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in maintaining labour, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to produce as great a quantity of work as possible. He endeavours, therefore, both to make among his workmen the most proper distribution of employment, and to furnish them with the best machines which he can either invent or afford to purchase. His abilities in both these respects are generally in proportion to the extent of his stock, or to the number of people whom it can employ. The quantity of industry, therefore, not only increases in every country with the increase of the stock which employs it, but, in consequence of that increase, the same quantity of industry produces a much greater quantity of work.

How much does any of this penetrate the conscious awareness of an economist today?

Criticising Keynes – four years later nothing has changed

The following are four notes I wrote to the Societies for the History of Economics website back in November 2011. Brad Bateman and Roger Backhouse had written a book on Keynes and Keynesian economics – Capitalist Revolutionary-John Maynard Keynes – and had put up a note to let others know. I had also written a book just then, so thought I would mention it since there are alternative ways of looking at things. As it happens, even four years later, six years following the dead hand of the stimulus was first applied – no one else has written a book explaining what is wrong with Keynesian economics and laying out the alternative. These four posts could have been written yesterday, given how economic theory has dug in and refuses even to so much as notice how useless its advice has been. In reading these, please note that others had written comments as as well, only some of which I mention.

Professors Backhouse and Bateman invite us to indulge in a visionary perspective in dealing with the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent recession that will not go away. They wish us to look at alternative ways of thinking about the economy and how it works.

As it happens, I have done just that. In August this year, Edward Elgar published my Free Market Economics: an Introduction for the General Reader which outlines the mechanics of an entrepreneurially-driven market economy embedded within a political structure where the rules and regulations that businesses work within are determined by others. And what is particularly notable about the book is that while it explains Keynesian economics as accurately as any other introductory text on the market, it is also at the same time the most relentlessly anti-Keynesian book written in the past forty years. Moreover, if you would like to have an economics text that explains the classical theory of the cycle – the best alternative I know to Keynesian theory – my book does that as well, and I think in this regard, it may be the first book to do so in over three-quarters of a century. To my knowledge, there is no other book like it, although I truly do wish the market was flooded by hundreds of alternative titles along the same lines.

Let me therefore highlight one of the sentences in the Backhouse-Bateman article:

“Even Keynes himself was driven by a powerful vision of capitalism. He believed it was the only system that could create prosperity, but it was also inherently unstable and so in need of constant reform.”

Well I can agree with half of this but the other half is plain wrong. Capitalism is without question the only system that can create prosperity. But as the existence in 1936 of the by then hundred year old classical theory of the cycle should tell you, there has never been much doubt that capitalist systems are subject to instability. Nor was Keynes intention to explain to his fellow economists that our economies were in need of constant reform, whatever that might mean. The point of The General Theory was to introduce into mainstream economic theory the notion of aggregate demand. (Read page 32 of the GT on Malthus and Ricardo if you are in any doubt). There is nothing else in the book that is novel or that has spread like a weed throughout the discipline the way this concept has. And its adoption has been the single most disastrous mistake economic theory has ever made. Because economists now think in terms of aggregate demand we are no longer capable of explaining even the basics of the cycle and cannot provide sound advice to governments when economies fall into recessions as they inevitably will.

Let me finally say that I endorse everything written by James Ahiakpor in his earlier post. But let me also add that while the tremendously faulty structure of the bailouts can only be explained by the need to do something straightaway, that there was a need for government action could have been found by reading Bagehot’s Lombard Street which was published in 1873. It was the stimulus that came after, pure Keynes in both structure and intent, that is the core problem we are dealing with right now. The stimulus packages themselves are the most important cause of the prolonged recession most economies are facing today. It is the problems of debt and deficit that are the major problems we must find answers to, not a failing financial system which was the problem in 2009. So where Backhouse and Bateman ask:

“How do we deal with the local costs of global downturns? … If economists want to help create a better world, they first have to ask, and try to answer, the hard questions that can shape a new vision of capitalism’s potential.”

OK, I’m in. Let’s find a solution to all of this and more. But if you think Keynesian theory is any part of the answer, then my friends, you are in my view part of the problem and in no way part of the solution.

Second tranche.

I appreciate Mason Gaffney’s query about the nature of my book. And if I could, I will reply using the text of a note I sent to Roger Sandilands after reading his brilliant compilation of some of the more difficult-to-find works of Allyn Young. Two of the longer parts within Roger’s compilation were Kaldor’s notes of Young’s LSE lectures which were delivered in 1927-29, and the various entries Young wrote in the 1920s for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. If you would like to see how economists thought about economic issues prior to the publication of The General Theory, this is the place to go. Hopefully, Roger will be able to let us know how to obtain copies of his compilation of Young’s work. But to explain what my book is about, I hope this note I wrote to Roger will explain how I think of this book myself:

“I have been meaning to write to you for some time. I took Allyn Young’s LSE lectures and Britannica entries with me as my morning train reading for many many mornings in a row and it was fantastic. The first thing that it confirmed for me was that the book I have written on Free Market Economics is actually what I wanted it to be. It is the book that an economist schooled in the classical tradition would have written in the absence of the arrival of the General Theory. I learned an immense amount from Young but all of it merely deepening my own understanding of things that I had absorbed from the classical literature generally. I attach the flyer for the book which you should ask your library to buy anyway, but if you look at it, you will see that it is classical theory right down to its downward sloping supply curves and its discussion of the theory of the cycle in an almost identical way to Young’s.

“The theory of the cycle as Young portrays it (discussed pp 76-84) is not just the classical stuff in general, but is explicitly soaked through with Say’s Law. He notes that J.-B. Say “pointed out” that “what is commonly called overproduction is merely ill-balance production” (p 77). And then on the next page, “people do not over-save, they miscalculate” (p 78). Where can you find that written in a textbook any more, other than in mine, of course.

“And if you look at my book, you will even find the history of economics discussed more or less in the same place, just half way past the middle (pp 85-88). He not only feels the need to say these things, but the logic of when to put the history into the text occurs to him in just the same way and at just the same point as it occurred to me.

“But it is not merely coincidence that our work is so in parallel, but it is that he and I both think about things in the same sort of way. I have the advantage of actually having seen Keynesian economics in action whereas one can only conjecture just how savage Young would have been about the GT had he seen it for himself. Given what he has written here, there is little doubt he would have found the GT nonsense from end to end. And now, today, instead of discussing Mises and Hayek alone, we would be also discussing Young.”

That is where my letter to Roger ends. But to supplement your reading of Young, for an explanation of the nature of the business cycle as understood by classical economists, the first edition of Haberler’s Prosperity and Depression is hard to beat. That is what I built my own chapters on. But if you go to Young, who unfortunately died at 53 in 1929, you will see these same theories described in more or less exactly the same way by someone writing before there was even a hint of the Great Depression to come.

Third tranche.

It is interesting to see just how relentlessly Roger Backhouse and Brad Bateman choose to ignore what I wrote. That was the reason I thought I would bring Allyn Young into the conversation since I understand perfectly well that some faraway economist living in the antipodes would have no standing in such discussions but I thought Allyn might. Nevertheless, I do wish to impress upon them once again that what I am writing about is a direct response to the issues raised. And since the only compass in which these issues can be properly discussed is the evolution of economic theory over the past hundred years, in every way this is a subject matter for this site.

Going back to the original NYT article, let me take the final sentence as the core point Backhouse and Bateman wished to make. What they wrote was: “If economists want to help create a better world, they first have to ask, and try to answer, the hard questions that can shape a new vision of capitalism’s potential.” To do this, they argued, economic theory should include a major recognition of government and its role. To emphasise how important this point is, they criticised Hayek and Friedman for ignoring the important contributions of government, writing:

“In the 20th century, the main challenge to Keynes’s vision came from economists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who envisioned an ideal economy involving isolated individuals bargaining with one another in free markets. Government, they contended, usually messes things up. Overtaking a Keynesianism that many found inadequate to the task of tackling the stagflation of the 1970s, this vision fueled neoliberal and free-market conservative agendas of governments around the world. That vision has in turn been undermined by the current crisis.”

Well, what I am trying to tell them is that I have attempted to do in my book on “Free Market Economics” exactly what they have argued needs to be done. It is not perfect but what is? And because of its hostility to Keynes and what he stands for, I fear that if they read it they would unlikely find much in it that would give them pleasure. But (a) it is obviously about capitalism (although the word does not appear anywhere in the book) and (b) it provides a vision of the world in which economic actions are of necessity buried inside a political structure. Don’t believe it? Here are the opening three paragraphs of the book:

“This is a book about the market economy.

“A market economy is one in which overwhelmingly the largest part of economic activity is organised by private individuals, entrepreneurs, for personal profit. Such entrepreneurs are private citizens not government employees. They make decisions for themselves on what to produce, who to hire, what inputs to buy, which machinery to install and what prices to charge.

“There are, of course, in every nation state legislative barriers put in place by governments which limit every one of these decisions. No market is or ever has been even remotely laissez-faire. Entrepreneurial decisions are circumscribed by the laws, rules and regulations that surround each and every such decision.”

My aim in writing the book was to explain to governments, and to their citizens, how an economy can be run so that prosperity for the largest number is the result. This is not a book about how governments should be kept away from economic interactions, a completely weird and self-defeating idea. This is a book that embeds within the text the very necessity for governments to intervene to make free markets work. The point that I try to make is that since governments not only are going to intervene but must, they should do so in a way that actually does some good.

But Backhouse and Bateman do not just say we need a new vision and leave it at that. In their article and subsequent post, they are promoting a book with the title, “Capitalist Revolutionary: John Maynard Keynes”. In their view, it is in Keynes that we are to find that vision. Well the point I wish to make is that it is precisely in Keynes that we will not find that vision, and that if we economists had any sense we would abandon Keynesian theory and policy root and branch. To draw some inference from Keynes that capitalism is in constant need of reform is about as vacuous a statement as I can imagine. The need for institutional adjustment to the changing nature of the world is hardly some great insight.

Fourth tranche.

Roger Backhouse and Brad Bateman have done us all an immense favour by opening up an issue that really ought to be at the top of the economics agenda today, and that is, given what we have discovered in the past two years, whether the Keynesian policy vision still makes much sense. They think it does, which is why they wrote their book, wrote their article for the NYT, and finally initiated this thread to alert the rest of us to what they have done.

Unless they were of the opinion that no one disagrees with them about Keynes and his vision, they must take it as a rightful expectation that there are some who are of a different persuasion and that they will actually say so in reply. And what seems to trouble some is this comment of mine and particularly the word “rancid”:

“The Keynesian policy vision has created a global nightmare both politically and economically, a nightmare whose end is nowhere in sight. There may be an old guard that wishes to cling to such rancid and outdated ideas but by now it ought to be obvious beyond argument that Keynesian policies do not work. There is not a single economy in the entire world that is safe from the ravages that the stimulus has caused.

“By all means, let us find a new vision, but for heaven sake, the last place we should be looking for that vision is in the works of John Maynard Keynes.”

There is nothing ad hom in this. It is, as Brad Bateman has himself noted, the ideas which I describe as rancid. It may not be a typical word used by economists but it gets my point across. Keynesian economic theory, assuming it was ever valid which I do not, should be seen by now as well past its use-by date and recognised as having become stale and moldy over the past three-quarters of a century. But in the use of this word, it is quite clear that it is the sin and not the sinner being attacked.

Thomas Humphrey has entered into this discussion thread in exactly the right way. A great scholar and one whose writings I admire, he has posted to say that the way Keynesian economic theory has developed since the 1930s has created a macroeconomic theory of immense power and penetration and that my approach would throw baby out with bathwater. And with this, the issues thatI think are important are engaged. And unless there were anything further for me to say on the issue of Keynesian theory and vision, I would have feel there is nothing else to add. I have said my piece. Keynes, yes or no. We report; you decide.

Rob Leeson has now, however, suggested that the moderator not only determine whether something ought to be published depending on its relevance, but also dependant on the choice of words used, on the number of words used and on some determination of the degree of ad hominem involved. I take it that Rob would not therefore have published my posts had he been the moderator which makes me grateful that he is not and Humberto is.

Of course we are all bad judges in our own case but I don’t think any of my posts, nor any of the others on this thread, have been too long. I have read each one through with great interest. And if they are too long, it is only the writer who loses out since eventually others stop reading what they have to say.

Who and where are the anti-Keynesians?

Below is a letter from Des Moore published in the Financial Review on 29 May. But before I get to the letter itself, let me first reprint the note I sent to Des.

If I assume, as I do, that Y=C+I+G is fundamentally wrong, and that a Keynesian approach to policy is bound to fail, then nothing about the economic problems that have followed the GFC is a surprise. But the questions I would like to ask are two:

1) Who are the leading actively anti-Keynesian economists in the world at the moment, assuming there actually is such a thing?

2) If Keynes is wrong, where should one go to find a more accurate theory of recession and unemployment?

In my view, these are the most important questions in economics at the present time. And I have to tell you that the great surprise to me is that virtually no one has an answer to the first of these questions, although there are some answers to the second.

Kind regards

Where is the locus of anti-Keynesian thought? Who is leading the attack? Des is discussing Robert Skidelsky versus Niall Ferguson, that is, a debate between two historians. Where are the economists? And I have to tell you that however this is resolved, it will not be because of some empirical study based on some dataset. If even at this late date, there is anyone in doubt that the stimulus has been a disaster, there is no turning back from going over the cliff yet again. Unless there is some understanding that existing theory is a deadly fault, that it must be abandoned as a guide to policy, then we will just carry on as before. Here’s the letter sent by Des to the AFR with my further commentary on the other side.

Historian Niall Ferguson argued that the reduction in budget deficits after the 2008-09 UK recession helped improve the growth in GDP while the author of a biography on Keynes, Robert Skidelsky, argued that it reduced it.

These arguments are about hypotheticals and difficult to judge. They are important, however, in the current context faced by Australia and other countries.

Note first that UK growth has recovered to pre-2008 rates after the 2008-09 recession. This has occurred notwithstanding that “underlying balances” (budget deficits) published by the OECD have fallen from 8.5 per cent of GDP in 2009 to an estimated 4.9 per cent in 2015.

Second, Skidelsky does not explain why the large deficits in each of the five years prior to 2008 then resulted in two years of recession.

Third, Skidelsky makes no reference to the policy implications of the increase in government debt levels, which are now over 100 per cent of GDP for major countries, including the UK.

Fourth, in his article published in Australian media in 1932 Keynes himself approved the Premiers Plan to reduce budget deficits. An examination of the recovery from the 1930’s recession shows that Australia performed better than most other countries and that President Roosevelt’s budget stimuli brought a slower recovery in the US.

The solution is to reduce the role of government and increase the opportunities for private enterprises.

I agree, of course, but what’s the theory? What is the foundation on which such advice is given? It’s not just that you should do this and this, but why should you do this and this. That is the issue to me. What disturbs me to a very great extent is that it is an issue that has not, so far as I can tell, been taken up by anyone anywhere.