The first example in modern history of a science actually going backwards

It is now regularly stated that we have to take the larger denomination bills out of circulation to combat crime. Makes no sense, but on the other hand, this seems very plausible. From Steve Hayward: KOMPULSORY KEYNESIANISM?.

What’s the idea behind negative interest rates? A hidden subsidy for mattress manufacturers perhaps? Nope: given that the various monetary and fiscal stimuli haven’t generated much growth either here or in Europe, negative interest rates are intended to enlist everyone as involuntary Keynesians—spend your money or we’ll take it from you. So who wants to keep their money in a bank—even a Swiss bank. Another example of a liberal idea so good it has to be made mandatory.

That is to say, the smaller is the largest note, the more difficult it is to merely hold money so everyone is forced to spend. Nothing has worked so the efforts to get people to spend will be re-doubled. This is that same crackpot Keynesian theory as ever, that economies are made to grow by increase in spending. This comment that followed the article captures the central economic idiocy of our time:

Monetary and fiscal “stimuli” are the same old economic frauds perpetrated over and over again. They’ve never worked in the past, and there is no chance they will work in the future. The only thing they have going for them is that they’re excuses for more government spending and government control of the economy.

The amounts of fiscal and monetary “stimulus” applied during the Obama years have exceeded all past efforts, with the result that we’ve had the worst “recovery” since the 1930s with no end in sight. As always, the Keynesian economists’ excuse is that we just haven’t taken enough of their poison.

Economic science is the first example in modern history of a science which is actually going backwards. Classical economists knew more about how to stimulate an economy 100 years ago than Keynesian economists know today.

Indeed it is so but how are you to find out?

Monetary policy and Say’s Law

Here is a bit of transcript from Reserve Bank Governor Glenn Steven’s in response to a question put by Craig Kelly MHR during a Parliamentary committee meeting. You could find neither the question nor the answer anywhere else in the world.

Mr CRAIG KELLY: There was an article published earlier this week in The American Spectator. If I just quote a few passages from it, you might like to comment. It said:

“America is languishing from historically low growth rates for the past ten years … In the fourth quarter of 2015, our growth rate was less than 1% at .70%.”

It goes on to talk about Japan. It says:

“Japan has followed this same pattern of high tax rates, lower interest rates, and endless government spending for the past 25 years. The result is massive federal debt, a slow growth economy, and reduced international competitiveness.”

Then it goes on to Europe:

“Europe has followed the same prescription, with similar results …”

Then it goes on:

“Jean-Baptiste Say theorized that the growth of economies is not demand-driven, but growth is created by new and lower cost products and services.”

Do you think that governments worldwide over the past six, seven or eight years have been too much focused on stimulating from the demand side rather than from the supply side?

RBA GOVERNOR, Mr STEVENS : Say’s law, as it is known, is a long-run proposition that supply creates its own demand. I think my colleagues are more educated in economics than I, but my sense is that mainstream economics would admit that there are occasions when, for one reason or another, aggregate demand in the economy can fall short of its supply capacity, and we lived through one of those. It is actually pretty likely that will happen in a financial crisis, and that is what happened. So it was appropriate for the countries affected—which were many, including us—to adopt more expansionary demand management policies, both monetary and, where space allowed, fiscal.

But then the question is: it is one thing to manage demand around the cycle—most mainstream economics accepts that some of that should be done, especially in deep downturn episodes where it is virtually certain that it is a deficiency of demand that has caused it—but, in the longer run, where does the growth come from? This is a point where I am a broken record, but this is the point we have made many times. It cannot really be the case that we get long-run growth by just using monetary policy which, in the end, borrows from tomorrow’s income to spend today. That cannot be a recipe for sustained, strong long-run growth. The sustained and strong long-run growth in living standards comes from innovation, risk taking, productivity et cetera et cetera. We have talked about all that, as you know, many times before, and I think the committee understands our view.

So I would say that in the past seven or eight years too much has been expected of monetary policy to keep delivering growth. Really—and I am speaking at a global level here—monetary policy globally has been asked to do something it cannot really do. It is not simple to put long-run growth on a better track, but this is why, when we hosted the G20, we talked about the growth plan structural initiatives. None of those initiatives were that the central bank should cut rates further to get the two per cent extra growth the G20 talked about, they were all structural things to help make economies work better—to help productivity, to assist innovation et cetera. That is where prosperity comes from. It does not come from manipulating the price of money. There is a place for doing that in a demand downturn but long-term growth does not come from that. We have been very clear about that.

The question is outstanding and the answer is pretty damn good as well.

The difference between value added and waste

wrong enemy right enemy

From a very insightful post with a very insightful diagram: The Right Kind of Class Warfare: Workers vs. Looters.

What makes this image so helpful is that it’s true. If you look at the “right enemy” part of the image, the rich in the red zone are the cronyists who get Ex-Im subsidies, the Wall Street crowd that fed at the TARP trough, and other well-connected folks (like Warren Buffett) who use government coercion to line their pockets.

It’s the difference between value adding and waste.

[Via Instapundit]

“Say’s Law need to be revived, pronto, if we are ever to recover from the Great Recession”

j.-b. say

What might interest you more than the words is that I didn’t write them, although I do, of course, agree with them completely. They are from an article in The American Spectator, Demand for Economic Growth by Bob Luddy.

Jean-Baptiste Say theorized that the growth of economies is not demand-driven, but growth is created by new and lower cost products and services. McDonald’s created huge demand in 1955 with a 15-cent hamburger, and now dominates fast food worldwide. As a result, a new, trillion-dollar industry has been created — eating away from home. We eat at grocery stores, fast food restaurants, at work, and from food trucks.

In 1925, Bell Labs made enormous investments in telephone technologies, resulting in international phone service at a modest cost. Today, electronics have improved service and lower costs, so virtually anyone can communicate worldwide.

Casual observation helps us validate Say’s Law. The big-box retailers have provided low-cost goods, stimulating demand for all types of consumer goods. We now have on-line vendors offering every product imaginable at even lower cost, delivered to your door by none other than FedEx, which did not exist when I was in college.

America has the opportunity to take full advantage of Say’s Law, and to create new demand and growth from investment and innovation. The requisites are: lower taxes, reduced regulation, and leaders to innovate. We must also focus on education, as innovators must have enormous knowledge to create the future world of ideas.

Small business, which creates the majority of new jobs, is especially challenged by government regulation, because financial and management resources are very limited.

This month marks the 80th anniversary of the publication of the second most destructive book in the history of economics. It actually requires concentrated mis-education to believe that buying things, rather than producing things, is the basis for growth and employment. I remain very uncertain about when Say’s Law will again return to the centre of economic policy, but I am absolutely certain that until it does, macroeconomic policy will do mostly harm and seldom do an economy any good.

[My very great thanks to Autumn Baroque for sending this article along.]

The study of the history of economic thought is a crucially important part of economics

First there was a notice posted at the History of Economics online discussion thread advertising a conference to be held later this year on “The Relevance of Keynes to the Contemporary World”. So I wrote a note which read:

I would like to note a concern I have about this conference.. I will concede that I do not know all of the scholars who have been invited to speak, but what strikes me as a serious problem is that none of the invited speakers whose views I do know can be described as a critic of Keynesian theory. Whatever anyone might think about what makes Keynes “Keynesian”, and which has kept his name alive today, it is this:

“Keynes’s insights for the management of domestic economies in the times of a global recession and European crisis”

One would hope that after the universal failure of the Keynesian stimulus after 2009 that there might at least be some effort to examine the flaws in the Keynesian system. Not a single economy has returned to full employment and robust rates of growth, and we are now seven years since the stimulus packages were first introduced. Debt and deficits are the central problems every economy is now having to deal with. By all means examine Keynes’s work, but at the same time in looking at its relevance, there should surely also be some attempt to look at its irrelevance, indeed at the strong likelihood that Keynesian policies are harmful and destructive.

Later this year a volume I have edited will be published presenting the views of a series of modern critics of Keynesian economic theory and policy. The most astonishing aspect in editing this book was to find how few vocal critics of Keynesian economics there are. They exist, but are very rare. I would think that for this conference to be a proper evaluation of Keynesian ideas, at least some of its critics should be invited to speak as well.

After a brief flurry of discussion, there was a note put out by the moderator of the discussion thread.

I distributed a few messages on the fiscal stimulus and hoped the discussion would die a natural death, but I am now getting quite a few messages, pro and con.

I would like to remind everyone that this is a history of economics list, so I do not think it is appropriate for a discussion of current economic policy. In addition, a list such as this is a poor vehicle for such a conversation, which we all know will end badly, with much more heat than light.

If you wish, I would be happy to send everyone who is interested in this discussion a list of like-minded folks and you can continue this conversation in private. Judging from the replies, there is really is great interest in this question, but I repeat that it is not within the bounds of our list.

Yours in moderation

To which I have now replied.

I complete agree with our moderator that this list is not the place to debate the merits of Keynesian economic theory and policy. I did not seek to open such a debate, but only meant to comment on the nature of a conference that looks at only one side of the issue, which its organisers are perfectly entitled to do. It is noteworthy, all the same, that there is an interest in just such a debate, but more interesting is that there is nowhere that it can be held. I do, however, also believe that this kind of debate is part of the history of economic thought. I go further and argue that one of the most important purposes in studying the history of economic thought is that we economists have a forum in which such issues can be discussed. This does not mean that an examination of Keynesian theory is only part of the history of economic thought. What I take this to mean is that a study of the history of economic thought is a crucially important part of economics.

And there, for the moment, things now lie.

Keynesian policy in three pictures

It’s my birthday, and my younger son has given me a present. You can see whose house he was brought up in. And while it may spoil the joke a bit by adding some commentary, you never know in this day and age what others will and will not see. The first picture is straightforward, however. You hear the equivalent said all the time in every economy.

josh keynes 01

The second is the subtle one. The government has chosen projects that will never repay their costs which means that the economy, so far as these expenditures go, will end up less well off at the end than it was before. Other projects, almost invariably from the private sector, will usually make up for this loss. But non-value-adding projects pull an economy backwards. If you are getting fewer units of output back compared with the number of units used up in production, living standards must contract. But as the picture shows, lots of people are employed. They are just not employed in projects that create net wealth, which includes those employed in industries supplying inputs.

josh keynes 02

Because Keynesian economics is all aggregates, the structural problems created by this expenditure is invisible both in theory and in relation to the actual circumstances of the economy. People are, to all appearances, working and producing. The problem remains that what is produced has less value than the resources used up. One day, as the debts pile up and deficits grow, the expenditure must be withdrawn with the result that the entire structure of production must then be reconfigured in a way that allows productivity to grow. That reconfiguration is infinitely more painful than things would have been had you let the economy adjust in the first place.

josh keynes 03

My son is neither an economist nor a graphic designer. The message is nevertheless sound and coherent with the presentation clarity itself.

And the world is changing. I have just been sent this from The Spectator: The one thing most people think they know about economics is wrong with the subheading, “Keynesian deficit spending makes sense – but over and over again it has not worked”. My What’s Wrong with Keynesian Economics? was sent off for production on Friday. Most people, especially economists, do indeed still think Keynesian theory “makes sense”, they just cannot work out why it never works. If they actually understood how an economy does work, they would understand why Keynesian theory is complete nonsense.

And because the manuscript has now gone off, I am heading off and away for my version of lying by the beach. Blogging may therefore be more intermittent than usual.

NO Keynesian stimulus has ever succeeded in bringing about a recovery

Some ideas just will not die, no matter how much damage they do. Keynesian economics is one of those. So let me say it again: NO Keynesian stimulus has ever succeeded in bringing about a recovery. Not one, not ever. Go on, you Keynesians out there. Name one, anywhere, any time. Name a single occasion when an increase in public spending brought a recession to an end and returned an economy with high unemployment to full employment. The General Theory was published in 1936. Since then, there is not a single occasion when an increase in public spending led to an economic recovery. Every pre-Keynesian economist would have understood not just this fact, but also why it was so. But such is the dead hand of received ideas, that economists continue to push for an increase in public spending to bring recessions to an end.

So here is the latest set of economic instructions, this time from Canada. The headline reads Economy needs bigger deficit spending with the sub-head, “economist tells Ottawa now is the time to spend, not worry about balanced books”. And this is how it begins:

Ottawa should not be afraid to spend a lot of money it doesn’t have quickly in order to give the economy a shot in the arm, an influential economist says.

That was the gist of a note Thursday from David Rosenberg, the chief economist and strategist at Toronto-based money manager Gluskin Sheff Inc.

During the recent election campaign, the Liberals ran on a pledge to run “modest” deficits in the $10-billion range for the next few years, in an attempt to stimulate the economy.

Debt-to-GDP can come down even with deficits, economists say
But Rosenberg says more drastic measures are warranted, noting that Ottawa could run deficits of up to $24 billion a year all the way until 2020 and still be below the average 70 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio among OECD nations.

Canada’s debt-to-GDP ratio currently stands at 31 per cent.

“What is Ottawa waiting for?” Rosenberg wrote.

“If the government wasn’t spending years strengthening our nation’s balance sheet to use it as a weapon against downside economic risks as is the case today, then what was the point of it all?”

Rosenberg says it is time for the federal government to get off the sidelines and start “fighting the economic forces” instead of leaving the heavy lifting to the Bank of Canada, in the form of monetary policy.

This is identical to the advice that Ken Henry gave Kevin Rudd, with the usual disastrous results. But it’s advice that has an older pedigree than that. Let me take you back to my 2009 classic, The Dangerous Return to Keynesian Economics, where you will find the identical advice offered to Japan in the 1990s.

Stanley Fischer, who in 1998 was the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, was very clear on the need for the massive increases in spending. Addressing a symposium in Tokyo in April that year, he said:

Japan’s economic performance is of course a matter of grave domestic concern. But given the prominent role of Japan in the world economy, and especially in Asia, it is also a legitimate matter for concern by Japan’s neighbors and by the international community. There is little disagreement about what needs to be done. There is an immediate need for a substantial fiscal expansion …

On fiscal policy, the recent suggestion of a package of 16 trillion yen, about 3 per cent of GDP, would be a good starting point. But, unlike on previous occasions, the program that is implemented should be close to the starting point. The well-known reservations about increases in wasteful public spending are correct: that is why much of the package, at least half, should take the form of tax cuts. Anyone who doubts the effectiveness of tax measures need only consider the effectiveness of last year’s tax increases in curbing demand.

The IMF is not famous for supporting fiscal expansions. And it is true that Japan faces a long-term demographic problem that has major fiscal implications. But after so many years of near-stagnation, fiscal policy must help get the economy moving again. There will be time to deal with the longer-term fiscal problem later.

Another example of the same kind of advice is found in a February 28, 1998, editorial in The Economist under the heading, “Japan’s feeble economy needs a boost”:

The [Japanese] government says it cannot afford a big stimulus because its finances are perilous. It is true that Japan’s gross public debt has risen to 87% of GDP, but net debt amounts to only 18% of GDP, the smallest among the G7 economies. The general-government budget deficit, 2½% of GDP, is smaller than its European counterparts’. Rightly, the Japanese are worried about the future pension liabilities implied by their rapidly ageing population. But now is not the time to sort the problem out. Far better to cut the budget later, when the economy has recovered its strength.

I need hardly point out that Japan’s “lost decade” has continued for more than twenty years yet in all the investigations over what had gone wrong, the increase in public spending has never even been glanced at. Modern macroeconomics is a disaster continuously in wait for its next victim. If you would like to understand why, once again I cannot suggest anything written more recently than 1936, other than, of course, this.

[My thanks to SMc for alerting me to the advice being offered to the Canadian PM, who will, no doubt, now take it.]

Government waste and the economics profession

Government waste is the greatest scourge every economy must face. The Chinese economy is trying to reverse the effects of its Keynesian stimulus, whose diabolical effects can no longer be denied. The projects of 2009-10 are showing up dead and the debts created cannot be repaid. Fixing what has gone wrong first requires you to understand what has gone wrong. The following “analysis” is mesmerising for its inanity:

China’s economic and financial market management credentials are drawing international criticism after a weak inflation result raised the prospect Beijing will be forced to slash interest rates to boost growth. . . .

Beijing reported at the weekend that China’s consumer price index rose by just 1.4 per cent over the year compared to the 3 per cent objective the government had put in place for the economy in order for it to achieve its annual growth target.

It’s real growth we are looking for, right? The inflation rate is just the difference between the nominal growth rate and the real growth rate. How inflation is supposed to give an economy faster real growth is the great conundrum. Perhaps they mean that higher inflation would be a sign of higher demand. But if that is the way it is being thought about, Keynesian economics has reached even lower depths than I had thought possible.

Still, that’s not all there is on the economic inanity front. There is also this: Turnbull needs community of believers for northern growth which begins as follows.

The Turnbull government has announced plans to boost growth and development across northern Australia, including the possible use of commonwealth loan guarantees for infrastructure projects.

As soon as this was hinted it was decried in certain corners as yet another example of misguided “industry assistance” — just an attempt by government to pick winners. I have been as critical as anyone about the perils of government winner-picking. It’s a fool’s errand at best, and a colossal waste of taxpayer money at worst.

If after years of pink batts and BER, never mind the NBN, doesn’t convince economists that governments have NO role in guiding our resources productively, then who will do it? There are many reasons for government spending, including some limited levels of infrastructure outlays. But grand visionary projects that absorb billions are idiocy of the highest order. They will make us poor. The Chinese have at least recognised that Keynesian-type expenditures are a menace to public finances and economic prosperity. Would Malcolm only do the same. Apparently, such expenditures on developing the North “is supported by very modern and very sound economics.” Modern it may well be. Sound, I’m afraid not. I will restrict myself to merely the first of the points made.

Australia is suffering from “secular stagnation”, a phenomenon recently popularised by former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers.

Summers postulates, and unfortunately the evidence supports his view, that the potential rate of growth of advanced economies has fallen so that GDP growth in the 2 per cent range is the new normal. The economic speed limit of advanced economies has almost halved.

This is because there is a huge surplus of global savings chasing too few productive investment opportunities. Just think about sovereign wealth funds along with all those billionaires looking for something to do with their money.

No doubt Malcolm is thinking about nothing other than our sovereign wealth funds, so if you are worried about your financial future, this is the time to make it clear that the government is to keep its hands off our money. Loan guarantees – that is, a promise of making good every losing market bet – will bring Solydnra-like projects out of the woodwork in such vast numbers that it will make you dizzy to watch.

But to believe that there is a massive pool of saving available that no one is tapping into is the very essence of Keynes. Our problem is an absence of saving. We do not have enough. I cringe when I see such arguments, but if you start with Y=C+I+G, you have no explanation for recession and stagnation other than deficient demand caused by over-saving. And as long as you believe that, you will never understand what to do to make an economy grow.

Economics for Infants

IMG_1982

My granddaughter had her first birthday today. I therefore wrote for her an instructional on all things economic, which I have titled Economics for Infants. There will be a new one every year and one for all siblings and cousins as they arrive. But so far, there is only she. Although really quick on the uptake, I didn’t wish to make it too complicated. But while she will never hear from me on the existence or otherwise of Santa, this is part of what I wrote since it is never too young to find these things out.

Most importantly, you must never think of the government as the same as your parents.

The government is not there to give you things although they might pretend that they do.

You cannot look to the government to feed you, to give you clothes, to keep you warm, to give you presents.

The government doesn’t even care about you, not even a tiny bit.

It may be a bit early to say to someone who cannot even walk that a satisfying life comes only if you are able to stand on your own two feet.

My son thought that I should have written something more story-like, along the lines of Animal Farm. And so I shall, but not until she is two when she will be more able to follow the analogy and see the ironies of life. In the meantime, I thought I would set the early scene for more to come.

My best paper published in 2015

This was my self-nomination for the Best Paper Award in the history of economics published during 2015. There are many other excellent papers that were also published so it is a very low probability entry. All the same, I believe the paper has genuine merit, as discussed in the note I sent to the Committee. I should mention that Mill’s Fourth Proposition on Capital states that “demand for commodities is not demand for labour”. If Mill is right, all modern macro is completely false.

Although my article is found in JHET and will therefore be automatically considered for the 2015 Best Paper award, I thought I would call attention to it since there are a number of aspects to it that may not be fully appreciated. The article is:

Kates, Steven. 2015 “Mill’s Fourth Fundamental Proposition on Capital: a Paradox Explained.” JHET. Vol 37, Number 1, March 2015, pp. 39-56.

Purely in terms of HET, the article explains in a completely natural way an issue that had been dealt with by some of the greatest economists of the past who could not fully make sense of what it meant. The proposition was first stated by John Stuart Mill in 1848, was never challenged in his lifetime and was described by Leslie Stephen in 1876 as “the best test of a sound economist”. Yet only fourteen years later, Alfred Marshall could not explain it, nor could Friedrich Hayek in 1941, both of whom tried to defend it in their own way. The proposition was attacked relentlessly by others. Keynes, for example, raises it twice within five pages in The General Theory (359n, 364n). It had last been looked at with any depth in HOPE in 1975 where the sub-title was “A Paradox Revisited”, emphasising the difficulty in making sense of the words. And yet, once the proposition is viewed within the context of the General Glut debate and within a classical understanding of Say’s Law, its meaning is apparent, indeed I would say obvious. It is thus not often that an issue that had remained unresolved since 1876 has been finally brought to an end. I compare Mill’s Fourth Proposition in the article to Fermat’s Last Theorem which, for economists, it is.

Second, the article does what I think HET ought to do – not exclusively, of course – but what it ought to do, at least where it is relevant, is use the economic theory of the past to illuminate economic issues of the present. The question whether increases in aggregate demand will lead to improvements in production and employment is a crucial issue in economics, never more so since the stimulus packages following the GFC have not led to a return to full employment and rapid growth. One does not have to agree with Mill to at least recognise that he has something to add to our contemporary debates. What if it is the case that an increased demand for goods and services does not lead to an increased demand for labour? This was not just Mill’s view, but was repeated as the “Treasury view” as late as the 1930s. Merely because macroeconomic theory today has rejected this conclusion does not mean that it is therefore certainly wrong. Some of the greatest economists who have ever lived accepted this conclusion. What this paper does is revisit this conclusion and puts the alternative perspective back into consideration.

It was also not my only paper published last year since I published two others, both on the role of the entrepreneur in economic theory. But this one was far and away the best.