The epitaph of our civilization foretold?

This is a note I have sent to the Societies for the History of Economics in relation to the Harvard final year economics exam. It is based around a truly insightful comment by Roger.

I have put the Harvard final economics exam up on my blog and have had a quite penetrating issue raised. This is what was written:

Question 5 is a particularly interesting one, given it was set 60 years ago and we are now able to be a “future historian”.

This was the question he was referring to, most of which consisted of a quotation:

5. “Future historians may well write the epitaph of our civilization as follows:

From freedom and science came rapid growth and change.
From rapid growth and change came economic instability.
From instability came demands which ended growth and change.
Ending growth and change ended science and freedom.”

Discuss this alleged conflict between economic growth and measures to secure economic stability. In your answer refer to the views of some of the great economists, for example, Schumpeter and Keynes, on this problem.

I might add that the quote is from David McCord Wright, in his 1948 publication, Democracy and Progress (p 81). What interests me, as was recognised in the blog comment, is that we are now in the position as historians some 67 years since the quote was published, and 62 years since the final exam on which it was found, to provide at least a tentative answer to the question. It is certainly arguable that we are at the third phase – “from instability came demands which ended growth and change” – and it is not impossible to wonder whether we may be seeing the start of the fourth – “ending growth and change ended science and freedom”. I therefore wonder how we might answer this same question today.

If you don’t understand the problem you cannot find the cure

Every so often, you run across someone who puts a new perspective on how badly the American economy is travelling. The caps to spending that came with the sequester have slowed the rot, but the anvil that has fallen on productive activity has not been lifted. The title here is Don’t Believe the Hype—We’re Not Even Close to Full Employment. Where he uses the word “hype”, I might have chosen “lies”, but at least he can explain plainly how far below potential the US economy is performing.

Before the recession, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected we would have 5 million more jobs at the end of 2014 than we actually do. It also projected that the GDP would be more than 11 percent higher in 2014 than it is now. This translates into a difference in annual output of roughly $2 trillion or more than $6,000 per person. They predicted that wage and salary income would be roughly 20 percent higher than it is today. Many economists had similar projections.

Measured against where these people expected the economy to be at this point seven years ago, the economy is indeed awful. Millions of people who should have jobs don’t, and those who do have jobs are working for much lower wages than would be the case in a healthy economy.

Alas, having noted that the economy is barely alive, and that the fact of growth is hardly remarkable in a market economy, he lays the problem on the absence of anything on the demand side to drive the economy upwards. You do have to despair at someone who sees how bleak things are but attributes it to a lack of demand. Demand is subdued because value-adding supply is subdued. Value-adding supply is subdued because there is no direction in which the American economy might move that is not blocked by government regulation and waste. It is a mess all round, but as long as even those who are even willing to notice are unable to see what must be done, how does it end? As bleak as the economy is, reading this kind of thing makes me think there is a lot worse to come.

Harvard Economics Final Exam 1953

This was provided by Ric Holt at the Societies for the History of Economics discussion thread. I suppose I should just preface this by noting how thoroughly modern it is (Samuelson plus Schumpeter), except for the historical knowledge that is presumed in the way the questions are framed. How many economists today would have a clue about David Ricardo’s theory of profit? Anyway, it’s a long piece so I will leave off. To better understand the nature of the exam, Ric, in discussing the context, wrote the following:

This was the general written examination for undergraduate students. The exam was for three hours, broken down into two areas. At the option of the examiner, an oral examination could be given, “if the mark of the student is in doubt.” Requirements for the economics major in the early 1950s included: 1) the completion of a certain number of courses in economics, government and history; 2) To choose a concentration in a special field of economics and take a number of courses in that area. There were five major “special fields” the student could choose from: a) Economic Theory, b) Economic History, c) Money and Finance, d) Market Organization and Control and e) Labor Economics and Social Reform; 3) To submit a plan of study for general courses, one’s special area of concentration and to participate in the tutorial program; 4) pass the general written examination in economics at the end of the senior year. For Honors besides answering more questions on the general exam the student had to hand in a thesis. What’s interesting with the questions is that they would be considered to be heterodox today, and probably could only be passed in a heterodox economics department, but at that time they were considered to be very mainstream questions. This supports my view that the mainstream is constantly changing — for the better that’s up for interpretation.

Here is the exam itself.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
GENERAL EXAMINATION

(Three hours)

Please note on the front cover of your bluebook the number of each question upon which you write, in the order followed in your book, and HONORS or NON-HONORS.

PART I
(One hour)
Economic Analysis

HONORS candidates answer ONE question taken from questions 1- 4.

l. “Depressions are caused by the exhaustion of investment opportunities and the rigidity of saving.” Discuss.

2. “Keynes’ theory may have undermined the neo-classical theory of the price level but it has left intact the neo-classical theory of relative prices.” Discuss.

3. “The basic criteria of anti-trust policy with respect to product markets are the same whatever the competitive structure of labor markets may be.” Discuss.

4. “Despite all the changes that have taken place in economic theory the profit motive continues to occupy the central role which it had in Ricardo’s theory.” Discuss the role of profit in (a) Ricardo, (b) neo-classical theory, (c) Schumpeter’s theory.

NON-HONORS candidates answer ONE question taken from questions 5-8.

5. “Future historians may well write the epitaph of our civilization as follows:

From freedom and science came rapid growth and change.
From rapid growth and change came economic instability.
From instability came demands which ended growth and change.
Ending growth and change ended science and freedom.”

Discuss this alleged conflict between economic growth and measures to secure economic stability. In your answer refer to the views of some of the great economists, for example, Schumpeter and Keynes, on this problem.

6. In explaining business cycles most economists place crucial emphasis on fluctuations in investment or capital goods.

Discuss the determinants of investment and the manner by which these factors operate upon investment to produce fluctuations in National Income.

7. The basic economic questions any society must somehow answer are: ( 1) What consumer and capital commodities shall be produced and in what quantities? (2) How shall the goods be produced, i.e., by whom and with what resources? (3) For whom are goods to be produced, i.e., how is the national product to be distributed among individuals? Outline the way in which these questions are answered in a perfectly competitive, free enterprise economy.

8. In addition to wages, interest, and rent, economists often talk about a fourth category of income: profit. What do economists mean by this return? What are the causes of profit and its function in a capitalistic system?

PART II
(Two hours)

All students are required to choose TWO of the four fields in Part II of this examination and to answer two questions in each selected field. Thus a total of four questions are to be answered in Part II with an allowance of a half hour per question.

A. Economic History

9. “The very increases in the possibilities of unrestrained competition of the past seventy-five years,through developments in transport, technology, the size and organization of firms, etc. – may in themselves partly explain some of the restraints on price competition that have appeared in this century.” Discuss both the developments and their alleged effects.

10. “In the past 150 years the United States economy has radically altered its relationship to the world economy and at intervals has been a seriously disturbing factor.” Discuss, including references to periods in the 19th as well as the 20th century.

11. “In spite of the waste, apparent exploitation, and graft, the railroads more than paid for themselves in terms of American economic growth.” Discuss.

12. Why did Hamilton favor a central banking system? What was the subsequent history in the 19th century of the issue that he poses? How satisfactory, in terms of the needs of an expanding economy, were the alternatives to a centralized banking system that existed
prior to 1912.

B. Money and Finance

13. What are the relations between a country’s balance of payments and its internal monetary and fiscal policies?

14. From a fiscal policy standpoint, what do you consider would be the best budgetary policy for the federal government to adopt in order to combat a growing deflationary trend?

Indicate the relative advantages and disadvantages involved in the policy you propose.

Indicate practical as well as theoretical considerations.

15. “Classical economists tended to view the amount of taxes paid by the private sector of the economy as measuring the amount of ‘burden’ which the government imposed on the private sector.” Do you agree with this view? If you do, what is the justification for your position? If you do not, what are some possible alternative ways of measuring the ” burden” of the government on the economy, and for what purposes can they be used?

16. “Older business cycle theories emphasized fluctuations in prices while modern ones emphasize fluctuations in income.” What is the theoretical and empirical justification for this change in emphasis?

17. What role did the Federal Reserve System play in financing the Second World War?

Discuss the impact of this experience upon money and banking in the United States.

C. Market Organization

18. The spread between prices paid farmers for products used as food and prices paid for these foods at retail was 55% of the consumer’s dollar spent for food in 1910-14. It was 54% in 1952 . Account for the failure of this spread to increase in spite of the great increase in processing, services, and transportation sold with the food.

19. Although price discrimination generally is regarded as being contrary to the public interest, it is expressly sanctioned in railroad rate-setting under another name: the “value-of service” principle.What cost and market characteristic of railroads might lead you to justify the use of discriminatory pricing in their case?

20. Bituminous coal is a “sick” industry. What are the causes of this “sickness”? What attempts have been made to impose “healthier” conditions on the industry?

21. Various techniques are used by oligopolistic industries in attaining stable and desirable price and production conditions. Explain at least three ( 3) of these techniques and discuss the possible reasons for using any one over another.

D. Labor Economics

22. What role did the courts play in labor-management relations in the latter part of the nineteenth century? How far was this situation changed subsequent to 1930?

23. What is collective bargaining? Is it a process of communication and education leading to agreement based upon mutually accepted and recognized goals and standards, or is it a temporary truce based upon balance of power with conflicting basic objectives?

24. Has organized labor “distorted” the wage structure and wage level of the country at the expense of the unorganized or the weakly organized and at the expense of the recipients of other functional shares?

25. How would you handle the problem of national emergency disputes?

If you are interested in finding out more, you can contact Ric at rholt@sou.edu

Maybe this austerity stuff works after all

There is only so long you can avoid reality, although Keynesians can go on for a very very long time. This is about the latest observations on the UK economy by Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF.

The head of the world’s economic watchdog delivered a stunning endorsement of the coalition’s record last night – saying Britain was setting an example to the rest of the world.

Christine Lagarde, director of the International Monetary Fund, said in much of the world growth was ‘too low, too fragile’.

But completing an extraordinary volte face on the Government’s austerity measures – which as recently as 2013 were being attacked by the IMP as ‘playing with fire’ – she called on other countries to look to the UK’s example.

Look all you like, but how would you explain it? Of course, with the modern textbook version of economic theory, this is all in the realm of impossible, just as they forecast in 2013. The story continues:

‘Certainly from a global perspective this is exactly the sort of result that we would like to see: more growth, less unemployment, a growth that is more inclusive, that is better shared, and a growth that is also sustainable and more balanced.’

Miss Lagarde’s endorsement will be greeted with delight by senior Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, who were angered by previous IMF criticism of their policies.

In 2013, the organisation warned that persevering with strict austerity policies risked denting Britain’s economic prospects.

Olivier Blanchard, chief economist at the IMF, said George Osborne was ‘playing with fire’ by pressing ahead with austerity, insisting: ‘In the face of weak demand it is really time to reconsider an adjustment to the fiscal consolidation plans.’

What would Blanchard know, anyway? Meanwhile, for the rest of the world’s economies, here is Ms Lagarde once again:

Strong headwinds from weak investment, substantial debt burdens and high unemployment are preventing a pickup in global economic growth despite a strengthening U.S. recovery and tumbling oil prices, International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde said.

A healthier U.S. and cheaper energy “won’t suffice to actually accelerate the growth or the potential for growth in the rest of the world,” the head of the emergency lender to nations said in a speech Thursday at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington.

“If the global economy is weak, on its knees, it’s not going to help,” said Ms. Lagarde in remarks previewing the IMF’s latest forecasts for the global economy due out on Monday.

The eurozone, at risk of a third recession in six years, continues to struggle with the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis. Japan is also mired in low inflation, high debt and anemic growth. And output in many major emerging markets—economies that have provided most of the gas for global growth over the last decade—is slowing faster than expected.

However, there is the US, which has been suffering under sequestration and restrained public spending since 2013:

Nonetheless, the IMF is upgrading its forecast for economic output in the U.S., one of the few advanced economies bucking the weak global-growth trend. But the world’s biggest economy and a shot in the arm from cheaper gasoline aren’t cures for deep-seated weakness elsewhere, Ms. Lagarde said.

If you think in terms of aggregate demand, my only message to you is that you will never understand how an economy works. You certainly could not explain the relative success of the UK and US.

Counterfactual regret minimization

This is an article about the first algorithm to solve a game of poker. Chess can be more easily solved because everything is open. Checkers the same. But poker has a very large level of uncertainty since some of the cards held by others are unknown. And the game that has been solved is only the two-person head-to-head version, not the game where half a dozen players are sitting around the table. But what interested me was the conceptual mechanism used, which is how I think most people behave in most genuinely risky situations.

The algorithm, named CFR+ by its creators, uses an improved version of a technique called counterfactual regret minimization (CFR). Past CFR algorithms have tried to solve poker by using several steps at each decision-point: coming up with counterfactual values representing different game outcomes; applying a regret minimization approach to figure out the strategy leading to the best outcome; and averaging the latest strategy with all past strategies.

Yet in the real world, although one can say that over time, this is the strategy that works, it doesn’t necessarily work all the time and other strategies can be successful in the short run for a minority of players. And therefore recessions. This is particularly the case in the financial sector, which is why everyone should be forced to play with their own money, and to personally absorb the losses when things go wrong.

Invaders from planet stupid

A very interesting post by Steve Hayward at Powerline with the title, First they came for the Sociologists. But in spite of its title, the post is mostly about economics.

The one field in the social sciences where there is the least presence of post-modern oppression-“privilege” types is Economics, which prompts me to propose the theorem that the presence of politically correct nonsense in an academic department is inversely proportional to the emphasis placed on rigorous regression modeling in the discipline (or knowledge of ancient languages).

I personally think modern economics is well to the left as an academic subject. The veneer of bourgeois respectability is important to economists if their economics message is to influence the political class. Mainstream economics is no longer about the need for free markets, but the importance of controlling free markets. It may be disciplined by various sets of data, but economic theory is no longer Adam Smith. It is, instead, the nearest thing to Marxism that still retains that overlay of markets, best represented by Keynesian theory. Keynes disarmed the Marxists of his time by siding with them over Say’s Law, which had perennially been the province of the economics far left and central to their critique of capitalism.

I have half a chapter on this in my Free Market Economics, beginning with the notion of “perfect competition”. “Perfect” implies that this is the ideal, and is contrasted with “imperfect” competition. Perfect markets cannot exist, given its definition (e.g. perfect knowledge). All other markets are imperfect, which leaves much room for intervention at every turn.

But even with my continuous criticism of mainstream theory, I believe there is only one economics. The “political economy” department at Sydney is merely a cop out. Whatever sociological version of economics that might be taught, unless they also do supply and demand and marginal analysis along with the full panoply of mainstream theory, it is useless, other than as a leftist critique of markets. This is a quote from Greg Mankiw who was on the other end of these barbarian invaders:

Those who attended either of the sessions I was involved with at the ASSA meeting know that the audience included some hecklers. During the first session, I was the target. During the second, Larry Summers was. (At one point, the moderator Bob Hall threatened to call security.) Here is a Washington Post article about the hecklers.

After the first session was over, one of the hecklers came up to me and asked, “How much money have the Koch brothers paid you?” My answer, of course, was “not a penny.”

I don’t find it odd that people disagree with me. I am always open to the possibility that I am wrong about lots of things, and I much enjoy talking with students and colleagues who have views different from mine. But I do find it odd that people who disagree with me are sometimes quick to question my sincerity. If I am wrong, it is sincere wrong-headedness, not the result of being on some plutocrat’s payroll, as some on the left want to believe.

The hecklers probably limit their own effectiveness by questioning the motives of those who disagree with them. I have found that to convince other people, it is usually best not to assume your own moral superiority but rather to talk with them as equals who just happen to have a different point of view.

Personally I think Greg was too mild in his criticism of these know-nothings. I disagree about a lot, but I am never in doubt that the economists I deal with know a lot more about economies than their non-economist critics, a lot lot more and within a proper contextual setting. The true worry is how sympathetic the Washington Post article is to these invaders from the planet stupid.

Keynes and Keynesian Economics in Light of the Financial Crisis

The economic societies of the United States meet over the first few days of the year, with the meeting this year in Boston. This is the full conference program which is gigantic. My interest is what is being said about the sad state of economic theory and its inability to provide guidance on how to find our way out of the present low state of our economies. This was the part of the conference I was most interested in myself:

Keynes and Keynesian Economics in Light of the Financial Crisis

So in its own way, you might say that these issues were on the agenda. However, not only was this the sole manifestation across the hundreds of papers given during the conference, but this was also not in any way part of the mainstream program, only tucked away as part of the program devoted to the history of economic thought. Clearly, none of this is of any genuine interest to virtually the entire profession. Nevertheless, all credit to Robert Dimand for putting the session together, and for treating this as the serious contemporary issue it is. These were the papers found in this session.

Keynes and Financial Crises
ROBERT DIMAND (Brock University)

The global economic and financial crisis that began in 2007 has renewed interest in Keynes’s analysis of whether the economic system is self-adjusting and of his proposals for ending depression. This analysis is complemented by Keynes’s more specific accounts of financial crisis, notably in his incisive “The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse in Money Values” (in his Essays in Persuasion, 1931) and his Harris Foundation Lectures, a body of work that is much less well-known.

Keynes, Wages and Employment in Light of the Great Depression
HARALD HAGEMANN (Universität Hohenheim)

The wage-employment relationship is one of the central and most controversial issues in the General Theory. . . . and etc for another 200 or so words.

James Meade and Keynesian Economics
SUE HOWSON (University of Toronto)

James Meade (1907-1995), although Oxford-educated, was one of the very first Keynesians, a member of the Cambridge “circus” which met to analyze and criticize Keynes’s just published Treatise on Money in the early months of 1931. Not only did he use Keynesian ideas in his writings throughout his long career; he was a major player in the implementation of Keynesian policies in Britain during and immediately after World War II. My paper will discuss his encounters with Keynes and his use and development of Keynesian economics in his own academic and policy work.

Not that you should think that Keynesian economics was mentioned nowhere else. It showed up one more time, under “Heterodox Macroeconomics”, a session put on by the Union for Radical Political Economics. But I do love his first line, which is something the rest of the profession would prefer to forget. I’ve put it in bold just because, and left the rest in just to see how tedious this stuff can be.

Keynes is Dead — Long Live Marx
ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH

Many liberal/progressive economists envisioned a new dawn of Keynesianism in the 2008 financial meltdown. More than five years later, it is clear that the much-hoped-for Keynesian prescriptions are completely ignored. Why? Keynesian economists’ answer: “neoliberal ideology,” which they trace back to President Reagan. Using a Marxian method of inquiry, this study argues, by contrast, that the rise/dominance of neoliberalism has much deeper roots than pure ideology, that the transition from Keynesian to neoliberal economics started long before Reagan was elected President and that the Keynesian reliance on the ability of the government to re-regulate and revive the economy through policies of demand management rests on an optimistic perception that the state can control capitalism. Contrary to such hopeful perceptions, public policies are more than simply administrative or technical matters of choice. More importantly, they are class policies—hence, continuation/escalation of neoliberal policies under the Obama administration, and frustration of Keynesian/liberal economists. The study further argues that the Marxian theory of unemployment, based on his theory of the reserve army of labor, provides a much robust explanation of the protracted high levels of unemployment than the Keynesian view, which attributes the plague of unemployment to the “misguided policies of neoliberalism.” Likewise, the Marxian theory of subsistence or near-poverty wages provides a more cogent account of how or why such poverty levels of wages, as well as a generalized predominance of misery, can go hand-in-hand with high levels of profits and concentrated wealth than the Keynesian perceptions, which view high levels of employment and wages as necessary conditions for an expansionary economic cycle.

The largest single problem with economic theory today is that economists do not even know they have a problem. But the second most important problem is that what ought to have been the most important part of the entire program was relegated to students of the history of economic thought, which is the one area of economic theory economists are trying to rid themselves of. It’s as if these are issues so completely settled that no one any longer has to waste their time thinking about any of it at all.

AND LET ME JUST ADD THIS: From the Wall Street Journal, The Depression That Was Fixed by Doing Nothing. Before Keynes, there was no such thing as a Keynesian stimulus, but recessions got fixed anyway:

Beginning in January 1920, something much worse than a recession blighted the world. The U.S. suffered the steepest plunge in wholesale prices in its history (not even eclipsed by the Great Depression), as well as a 31.6% drop in industrial production and a 46.6% fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Unemployment spiked, and corporate profits plunged.

What to do? “Nothing” was the substantive response of the successive administrations of Woodrow Wilson and Warren G. Harding. Well, not quite nothing. Rather, they did what few 21st-century policy makers would have dared: They balanced the federal budget and—via the still wet-behind-the-ears Federal Reserve—raised interest rates rather than lowering them. Curiously, the depression ran its course. Eighteen months elapsed from business-cycle peak to business-cycle trough—following which the 1920s roared.

That was what they did, but with the low state of economic knowledge today, there is little likelihood anyone will understand why it worked.

McCracken, Malthus and Say’s Law

It was all the way back in October that I received an email from Thomas Colignatus, a blogger in The Netherlands. He had read my article on the origins of the General Theory and had written a post on it titled, Thomas Robert Malthus visiting Maastricht. This is how he begins his post in relation to what I had written:

Malthus set John Maynard Keynes on the path of the theory of effective demand. Keynes in his Essays in Biography:

“If only Malthus, instead of Ricardo, had been the parent stem from which nineteenth-century economics proceeded, what a much wiser and richer place the world would be to-day!” (Keynes 1961 [1933], p. 120)

Relevant is also this archive of the History of Economics Review, and in particular Steven Kates on JMK and TRM and then also on JMK and McCracken, or see the longer discussion by Kates in HER 48, 2008.

“Thus, at the very time that he has commenced writing the book that will become the General Theory, the single most influential book on the business cycle written during the past century, Keynes states in no uncertain terms that the most fruitful approach to dealing with the economic issues raised by the cycle ought to be set within an analytical framework that descends from Malthus.” (Kates HER 48, 2008)

Note that David Ricardo isn’t kicked out of the window. His method of mathematical modeling is retained, of course. His arguments are duly weighted too. The only thing is that Malthus’s argument on the lack of demand finds proper recognition. What was counter-intuitive to Ricardo is rephrased so that it becomes the proper intuition that we enjoy today. Merely putting money in the bank doesn’t help: it are the real investments that determine income.

“The Keynesian Revolution, which swept the economics world in a matter of less than a decade, had its origins in Keynes’s reading of Malthus’s letters to Ricardo in late 1932. It was from these letters that Keynes discovered the issue of demand deficiency. Reading Malthus’s letters in the midst of the Great Depression infused within him the be­lief that demand deficiency was the cause of recession and mass unem­ployment. The essay on Malthus, found in Keynes’s Essays in Biography and published in February 1933, makes plain the extent to which he had absorbed Malthus’s economic views while reading Malthus’s writings. Malthus had been the leading advocate of demand deficiency in the nineteenth century. It was this message that Keynes’s carried into the twentieth.” (Kates 2010, History of Economic Ideas, xviii/2010/3)

I can only say that it has been a long semester, and while I ought to write to people immediately, there was a lot to write about. Even with this reply which I attach below, there is much more I could have written and should have written. But this gets to the issues at hand, or at least some of them.

Dear Thomas

I apologise for this long time in writing. And the delay was not because I was in any way hostile to what you had written. I actually found myself very pleased to see how accurately pretty well all of what you wrote was. If I were to say anything at all about the text, it is that while I do not think of Keynes as a plagiarist in the normal sense, I am certain he knew the sources of what he wrote but preferred to be thought original than have to share the glory with anyone else. There is no doubt in my mind that Keynes found knocking over Say’s Law the perfect vehicle for him to get governments to spend money in the midst of recession. He came upon Malthus in later 1932 because he was updating his Essay on Malthus, he borrowed Malthus’s letters to Ricardo from his closest friend, Piero Sraffa, and discovered the entire literature on demand deficiency. He is then swept along by his discovery and by one of the stranger flukes of history, is sent a copy of McCracken’s book that does two things. It completes every thought he had had about demand deficiency and Say’s Law, even giving him the phrase “supply creates its own demand”. And it disturbs him to find that someone else had seen exactly the same thing, either simultaneously, or more likely, even before he had, given how long it takes to get a book into publication. My memory on this is a bit suss by now, but I somehow recall that this was a book that was sent out to a few people McCracken thought would be interested, which is why Keynes takes the trouble to write to McCracken personally. It doesn’t matter much, but if it is not a personally sent copy, there is no reason for Keynes to have written to McCracken at all.

As for the phrase itself, I am not even sure that Keynes recognised that he had taken it from McCracken. In my view, he would never have used the phrase in the way he did if it had McCracken’s DNA all over it. Either he read it and noted the phrase since it so perfectly fit into the point he was trying to make and then forgot the source, or he merely thought that McCracken had himself taken it from the classical literature. But it is the one absolutely certain dye marker that connects Keynes to McCracken. I had always been convinced that McCracken had been a major influence on Keynes. He appears as an “undocumented” influence, in my Say’s Law and the Keynesian Revolution (Elgar 1998). It was only when Richard Kent picked this up years later – my thesis was written before internet searches were possible – that I was finally able to nail the connection. It is now absolutely undeniable, except that everyone in the Keynes industry continues to deny it.

And I do have to disagree with you where you write that “McCracken’s book did not contain other elements that Keynes was concerned about”. I read every pre-Keynesian book on the cycle as part of the research, which is why I read McCracken. But the moment I picked McCracken up, I knew that I was reading a preliminary version of The General Theory. It is wall-to-wall Keynesian pre-history. And the other interesting part about the General Theory is that all of the parts on Mill and Say’s Law and supply creates its own demand are not found in the three sets of galley proofs. This was inserted at the absolute last moment, either because he didn’t want anyone else to know what he was doing, or he felt he needed to strengthen the attack on established theory, or because it only occurred to him at the last minute. But he must have put this in almost at the very last minute either during Christmas 1935 or just after the New Year in 1936. I don’t think it was a last minute decision, myself, since it is so neatly done. But it was an issue he kept from every single person he had been dealing with, other than Sraffa, who knew exactly what Keynes was up to. And if you cross over to Cambridge, you can see Sraffa’s “Notes on the General Theory” which are sitting in the archive but have never been published. I have tried to publish them myself, but they will never be allowed out, you may be sure of that, or at least not for some time yet.

Anyway, I was very grateful that HEI published my article, so it remains in the literature, studiously ignored by everyone. To me, the combination of Fred Taylor’s general publication of the phrase “Say’s Law” in 1921, and McCracken’s first use of the phrase “supply creates its own demand” in 1933, is a devastating revelation, that if it became the issue it ought to be, would absolutely require a wholesale revision of the mythological version of the trek from the Treatise to the General Theory. I hear these nonsensical stories about the major role of the Cambridge Circus and the rest of it, but it is all horsefeathers to me. But you either have to take the evidence as it is, and recognise that Keynes out and out misled everyone about how he came to write the book, or you have to shrug your shoulders and say that he wrote his book, without telling everyone what he was actually doing at the time.

However, if you actually understand that he was reading McCracken and probably Taylor, there is a very different story to tell about the genealogy, and about the actual effect of the General Theory on the nature of economics, since he was absolutely wrong about the economics of his classical forebears. This is an instance, in my view, where understanding the history makes a very large difference to understanding the present.

UPDATE: Mantaray asks:

“Supply creates its own demand”. OK, so we all know this is a strawman. Is there a correct one-line definition?

I know this is already a long post, but who else is around at the moment, so I have taken this opportunity to slip all this in. Here is the best one-line definition in the whole of the economics literature. It is from a private letter written by David Ricardo to Malthus on 9 October 1820 (source: Ricardo 1951-73: VIII. 277), just after Malthus had touched off the General Glut debate with the publication of his Principles of Political Economy earlier that year.

“Men err in their productions; there is no deficiency of demand”.

There are three parts I like about it, all devastating for Keynesians. First, although Keynes specifically states that Ricardo and those who followed did not recognise the very fact of recessions, it is absolutely clear that Ricardo and Malthus are discussing the nature of economic recession and their cause. Second, Ricardo provides in short form, a summary of the classical theory of recession. The economy becomes misdirected for some reason. Recessions are structural, due to errors on the production side. Third, we have the true meaning of Say’s Law, stated as clearly as one could wish: whatever may be the cause of the downturn, “there is no deficiency of demand”. Every economist from Ricardo’s time till the publication of The General Theory in 1936 believed exactly that. Today, it’s down to me and about a couple of dozen others. Modern macroeconomic theory is a well recognised classical economic fallacy.