The mystery of the Keynesian Revolution

Here is another book just published about the Keynes, this one, Reinterpreting The Keynesian Revolution by Robert Cord. This is what it’s about.

Various explanations have been put forward as to why the Keynesian Revolution in economics in the 1930s and 1940s took place. Some of these point to the temporal relevance of John Maynard Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), appearing, as it did, just a handful of years after the onset of the Great Depression, whilst others highlight the importance of more anecdotal evidence, such as Keynes’s close relations with the Cambridge ‘Circus’, a group of able, young Cambridge economists who dissected and assisted Keynes in developing crucial ideas in the years leading up to the General Theory.

However, no systematic effort has been made to bring together these and other factors to examine them from a sociology of science perspective. This book fills this gap by taking its cue from a well-established tradition of work from history of science studies devoted to identifying the intellectual, technical, institutional, psychological and financial factors which help to explain why certain research schools are successful and why others fail. This approach, it turns out, provides a coherent account of why the revolution in macroeconomics was ‘Keynesian’ and why, on a related note, Keynes was able to see off contemporary competitor theorists, notably Friedrich von Hayek and Michal Kalecki.

There are many reasons why it happened, but there is this for starters: if you say to kids that the best way to grow up strong and healthy is to eat lots of chocolate cake you will need to do very little convincing. You will actually ruin their health, but they won’t know that until they have tried it for themselves.

My own contribution to this issue of why Keynes with this theory at that time is to point out that Keynes was reading Malthus’s letters to Ricardo at the bottom of the Great Depression at the end of 1932 while preparing his “Essay on Malthus” for his Essays in Biography that was published at the start of 1933. And there, in the midst of Malthus’s letters, he discovered the general glut debate of the 1820s and Malthus’s arguments attributing recessions and unemployment to demand deficiency. So obvious is this sequence that it remains the most mysterious of all of the mysteries I have encountered in my dealing with Keynes and the Keynesians that not only do they not accept that reading Malthus had any effect on Keynes’s thinking, they will not even consider it as a possibility. But that’s how it happened, and the more evidence I have the more resolutely it is ignored. If you want to look at the sociology of science in relation to Keynes, that is where I would start.

When Adam Smith wrote on “the wealth of nations” what did he mean by “wealth”?

This was the initial query sent to the Societies for the History of Economic Thought discussion thread on June 16.

Dear colleagues,
I’m trying to trace the source of translating “economics” as “the science of wealth” (and sometimes “the science of the wealth of nations”) in late nineteenth-century Ottoman-Turkish. Ottoman economists most probably rendered it from French (“la science de la richesse”), from popular sources preceding the 1860s. I could find expressions like “l’économie politique est la science de la richesse” in many economic texts from the era, but I’m trying to understand how common it was to use “la science de la richesse” instead of or interchangeably with “l’économie politique” referring to the discipline itself.

What has followed has been a brief discourse that amounts to the statement from one of the French correspondents that “it is very easy to show that ‘science de la richesse‘ was a synonym of political economy in the first half of 19th century, not from ‘popular sources’ but just to explain the title of books.” I have therefore sent my own brief contribution along, because I do think that words make a very great deal of difference in how we think and what we are able to understand.

It has seemed to me for a while that the title, The Wealth of Nations, is an eighteenth century use of words and is somewhat misleading as to the point that Smith was making. I have tried to find a modern phrase that would capture what he meant, and the closest I have been able to come to is: The Prosperity of Nations. “Wealth” has a kind of treasure chest notion to it (which it may not have had back then), and the word “wealthy” is tied to personal riches, which is not at all, I think, what Smith was trying to get at. So when I read that the French for “wealth” is “richesse“, or that my google translator turns “The Wealth of Nations” into “la richesse des nations“, I really do therefore wonder how much has been lost in translation. Because when I translate the English word “riches” into French, it gives me “richesse” once again. The alternative French to English of “richesse” are “wealth”, “richness”, “riches”, “rich” and “affluent”. And for the French word “riche” we get these English translations: “rich”, “wealthy”, “affluent”, “opulent”, “splendid” and “luxurious”. Each of them seem totally inadequate to making sense of what Smith had in mind or what the book is about. This seems to me more than just a curiosity.

Riding the tiger and hoping for the best

This is where the US is now at: Fed holds off on interest rate hike, downgrades economic forecast.

Federal Reserve policymakers on Wednesday kept the central bank’s benchmark short-term interest rate near zero, opting against the first increase since 2006 after determining the economy still isn’t strong enough to handle it.

Fed officials sharply downgraded their economic forecast for this year. They projected the economy would grow between 1.8% and 2% this year, well below the range of 2.3% to 2.7% in its last forecast in March.

If they’re correct, annual growth would be the worst since 2011 and would be far from the breakout performance some economists had hoped for this year.

And this is where the US is eventually to be at. From Drudge:

BANK OF GREECE WARNS OF ‘UNCONTROLLABLE CRISIS’…
Greeks stashing bundles of cash in homes in fear of ‘Grexit’…
PANIC AT THE BANK: CUSTOMER PAYMENTS ‘MISSING’ FROM ACCOUNTS IN UK…
‘Glitch’…
LEW: ‘Foreign shocks’ could harm USA financial stability…

Not to worry. They’ll be able to start raising rates in the US again when there’s a Republican President. Until then, they ride the tiger and hope for the best. But this is what you get when you try to make your economy grow from the demand side.

Adam Smith on Say’s Law

The actual mechanism of exchange that is often mistaken for Say’s Law is the statement that demand is constituted by supply. Purchases are made with the money one has received from producing and selling. How odd that I had never noticed this in Adam Smith before where he writes exactly that. This is from the Introduction to Book II, “On the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock”:

When the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the produce of a man’s own labour can supply but a very small part of his occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce of other men’s labour, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the same thing, with the price of the produce of his own. But this purchase cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own labour has not only been completed, but sold.

Ah those two words, “but sold”. It’s not enough to produce something. Whatever one has produced must be then be converted into money before one can then buy something else: C-M-C’.

Smith also goes further in that same intro by discussing the role of the entrepreneur in finding value adding forms of work for employees who could not do so on their own. This is where Keynesian economics breaks down in the belief that a community can spend its money before it is earned. Perhaps an individual can, but not everyone together. In the passage below, the stock held by the employer would today basically consist of those lines of credit that allow employers to pay their workers before the goods they are producing find buyers. That stock must exist if individuals are to receive the goods they then purchase with their wages:

As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this great improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumulation naturally leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in maintaining labour, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to produce as great a quantity of work as possible. He endeavours, therefore, both to make among his workmen the most proper distribution of employment, and to furnish them with the best machines which he can either invent or afford to purchase. His abilities in both these respects are generally in proportion to the extent of his stock, or to the number of people whom it can employ. The quantity of industry, therefore, not only increases in every country with the increase of the stock which employs it, but, in consequence of that increase, the same quantity of industry produces a much greater quantity of work.

How much does any of this penetrate the conscious awareness of an economist today?

Criticising Keynes – four years later nothing has changed

The following are four notes I wrote to the Societies for the History of Economics website back in November 2011. Brad Bateman and Roger Backhouse had written a book on Keynes and Keynesian economics – Capitalist Revolutionary-John Maynard Keynes – and had put up a note to let others know. I had also written a book just then, so thought I would mention it since there are alternative ways of looking at things. As it happens, even four years later, six years following the dead hand of the stimulus was first applied – no one else has written a book explaining what is wrong with Keynesian economics and laying out the alternative. These four posts could have been written yesterday, given how economic theory has dug in and refuses even to so much as notice how useless its advice has been. In reading these, please note that others had written comments as as well, only some of which I mention.

Professors Backhouse and Bateman invite us to indulge in a visionary perspective in dealing with the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent recession that will not go away. They wish us to look at alternative ways of thinking about the economy and how it works.

As it happens, I have done just that. In August this year, Edward Elgar published my Free Market Economics: an Introduction for the General Reader which outlines the mechanics of an entrepreneurially-driven market economy embedded within a political structure where the rules and regulations that businesses work within are determined by others. And what is particularly notable about the book is that while it explains Keynesian economics as accurately as any other introductory text on the market, it is also at the same time the most relentlessly anti-Keynesian book written in the past forty years. Moreover, if you would like to have an economics text that explains the classical theory of the cycle – the best alternative I know to Keynesian theory – my book does that as well, and I think in this regard, it may be the first book to do so in over three-quarters of a century. To my knowledge, there is no other book like it, although I truly do wish the market was flooded by hundreds of alternative titles along the same lines.

Let me therefore highlight one of the sentences in the Backhouse-Bateman article:

“Even Keynes himself was driven by a powerful vision of capitalism. He believed it was the only system that could create prosperity, but it was also inherently unstable and so in need of constant reform.”

Well I can agree with half of this but the other half is plain wrong. Capitalism is without question the only system that can create prosperity. But as the existence in 1936 of the by then hundred year old classical theory of the cycle should tell you, there has never been much doubt that capitalist systems are subject to instability. Nor was Keynes intention to explain to his fellow economists that our economies were in need of constant reform, whatever that might mean. The point of The General Theory was to introduce into mainstream economic theory the notion of aggregate demand. (Read page 32 of the GT on Malthus and Ricardo if you are in any doubt). There is nothing else in the book that is novel or that has spread like a weed throughout the discipline the way this concept has. And its adoption has been the single most disastrous mistake economic theory has ever made. Because economists now think in terms of aggregate demand we are no longer capable of explaining even the basics of the cycle and cannot provide sound advice to governments when economies fall into recessions as they inevitably will.

Let me finally say that I endorse everything written by James Ahiakpor in his earlier post. But let me also add that while the tremendously faulty structure of the bailouts can only be explained by the need to do something straightaway, that there was a need for government action could have been found by reading Bagehot’s Lombard Street which was published in 1873. It was the stimulus that came after, pure Keynes in both structure and intent, that is the core problem we are dealing with right now. The stimulus packages themselves are the most important cause of the prolonged recession most economies are facing today. It is the problems of debt and deficit that are the major problems we must find answers to, not a failing financial system which was the problem in 2009. So where Backhouse and Bateman ask:

“How do we deal with the local costs of global downturns? … If economists want to help create a better world, they first have to ask, and try to answer, the hard questions that can shape a new vision of capitalism’s potential.”

OK, I’m in. Let’s find a solution to all of this and more. But if you think Keynesian theory is any part of the answer, then my friends, you are in my view part of the problem and in no way part of the solution.

Second tranche.

I appreciate Mason Gaffney’s query about the nature of my book. And if I could, I will reply using the text of a note I sent to Roger Sandilands after reading his brilliant compilation of some of the more difficult-to-find works of Allyn Young. Two of the longer parts within Roger’s compilation were Kaldor’s notes of Young’s LSE lectures which were delivered in 1927-29, and the various entries Young wrote in the 1920s for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. If you would like to see how economists thought about economic issues prior to the publication of The General Theory, this is the place to go. Hopefully, Roger will be able to let us know how to obtain copies of his compilation of Young’s work. But to explain what my book is about, I hope this note I wrote to Roger will explain how I think of this book myself:

“I have been meaning to write to you for some time. I took Allyn Young’s LSE lectures and Britannica entries with me as my morning train reading for many many mornings in a row and it was fantastic. The first thing that it confirmed for me was that the book I have written on Free Market Economics is actually what I wanted it to be. It is the book that an economist schooled in the classical tradition would have written in the absence of the arrival of the General Theory. I learned an immense amount from Young but all of it merely deepening my own understanding of things that I had absorbed from the classical literature generally. I attach the flyer for the book which you should ask your library to buy anyway, but if you look at it, you will see that it is classical theory right down to its downward sloping supply curves and its discussion of the theory of the cycle in an almost identical way to Young’s.

“The theory of the cycle as Young portrays it (discussed pp 76-84) is not just the classical stuff in general, but is explicitly soaked through with Say’s Law. He notes that J.-B. Say “pointed out” that “what is commonly called overproduction is merely ill-balance production” (p 77). And then on the next page, “people do not over-save, they miscalculate” (p 78). Where can you find that written in a textbook any more, other than in mine, of course.

“And if you look at my book, you will even find the history of economics discussed more or less in the same place, just half way past the middle (pp 85-88). He not only feels the need to say these things, but the logic of when to put the history into the text occurs to him in just the same way and at just the same point as it occurred to me.

“But it is not merely coincidence that our work is so in parallel, but it is that he and I both think about things in the same sort of way. I have the advantage of actually having seen Keynesian economics in action whereas one can only conjecture just how savage Young would have been about the GT had he seen it for himself. Given what he has written here, there is little doubt he would have found the GT nonsense from end to end. And now, today, instead of discussing Mises and Hayek alone, we would be also discussing Young.”

That is where my letter to Roger ends. But to supplement your reading of Young, for an explanation of the nature of the business cycle as understood by classical economists, the first edition of Haberler’s Prosperity and Depression is hard to beat. That is what I built my own chapters on. But if you go to Young, who unfortunately died at 53 in 1929, you will see these same theories described in more or less exactly the same way by someone writing before there was even a hint of the Great Depression to come.

Third tranche.

It is interesting to see just how relentlessly Roger Backhouse and Brad Bateman choose to ignore what I wrote. That was the reason I thought I would bring Allyn Young into the conversation since I understand perfectly well that some faraway economist living in the antipodes would have no standing in such discussions but I thought Allyn might. Nevertheless, I do wish to impress upon them once again that what I am writing about is a direct response to the issues raised. And since the only compass in which these issues can be properly discussed is the evolution of economic theory over the past hundred years, in every way this is a subject matter for this site.

Going back to the original NYT article, let me take the final sentence as the core point Backhouse and Bateman wished to make. What they wrote was: “If economists want to help create a better world, they first have to ask, and try to answer, the hard questions that can shape a new vision of capitalism’s potential.” To do this, they argued, economic theory should include a major recognition of government and its role. To emphasise how important this point is, they criticised Hayek and Friedman for ignoring the important contributions of government, writing:

“In the 20th century, the main challenge to Keynes’s vision came from economists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who envisioned an ideal economy involving isolated individuals bargaining with one another in free markets. Government, they contended, usually messes things up. Overtaking a Keynesianism that many found inadequate to the task of tackling the stagflation of the 1970s, this vision fueled neoliberal and free-market conservative agendas of governments around the world. That vision has in turn been undermined by the current crisis.”

Well, what I am trying to tell them is that I have attempted to do in my book on “Free Market Economics” exactly what they have argued needs to be done. It is not perfect but what is? And because of its hostility to Keynes and what he stands for, I fear that if they read it they would unlikely find much in it that would give them pleasure. But (a) it is obviously about capitalism (although the word does not appear anywhere in the book) and (b) it provides a vision of the world in which economic actions are of necessity buried inside a political structure. Don’t believe it? Here are the opening three paragraphs of the book:

“This is a book about the market economy.

“A market economy is one in which overwhelmingly the largest part of economic activity is organised by private individuals, entrepreneurs, for personal profit. Such entrepreneurs are private citizens not government employees. They make decisions for themselves on what to produce, who to hire, what inputs to buy, which machinery to install and what prices to charge.

“There are, of course, in every nation state legislative barriers put in place by governments which limit every one of these decisions. No market is or ever has been even remotely laissez-faire. Entrepreneurial decisions are circumscribed by the laws, rules and regulations that surround each and every such decision.”

My aim in writing the book was to explain to governments, and to their citizens, how an economy can be run so that prosperity for the largest number is the result. This is not a book about how governments should be kept away from economic interactions, a completely weird and self-defeating idea. This is a book that embeds within the text the very necessity for governments to intervene to make free markets work. The point that I try to make is that since governments not only are going to intervene but must, they should do so in a way that actually does some good.

But Backhouse and Bateman do not just say we need a new vision and leave it at that. In their article and subsequent post, they are promoting a book with the title, “Capitalist Revolutionary: John Maynard Keynes”. In their view, it is in Keynes that we are to find that vision. Well the point I wish to make is that it is precisely in Keynes that we will not find that vision, and that if we economists had any sense we would abandon Keynesian theory and policy root and branch. To draw some inference from Keynes that capitalism is in constant need of reform is about as vacuous a statement as I can imagine. The need for institutional adjustment to the changing nature of the world is hardly some great insight.

Fourth tranche.

Roger Backhouse and Brad Bateman have done us all an immense favour by opening up an issue that really ought to be at the top of the economics agenda today, and that is, given what we have discovered in the past two years, whether the Keynesian policy vision still makes much sense. They think it does, which is why they wrote their book, wrote their article for the NYT, and finally initiated this thread to alert the rest of us to what they have done.

Unless they were of the opinion that no one disagrees with them about Keynes and his vision, they must take it as a rightful expectation that there are some who are of a different persuasion and that they will actually say so in reply. And what seems to trouble some is this comment of mine and particularly the word “rancid”:

“The Keynesian policy vision has created a global nightmare both politically and economically, a nightmare whose end is nowhere in sight. There may be an old guard that wishes to cling to such rancid and outdated ideas but by now it ought to be obvious beyond argument that Keynesian policies do not work. There is not a single economy in the entire world that is safe from the ravages that the stimulus has caused.

“By all means, let us find a new vision, but for heaven sake, the last place we should be looking for that vision is in the works of John Maynard Keynes.”

There is nothing ad hom in this. It is, as Brad Bateman has himself noted, the ideas which I describe as rancid. It may not be a typical word used by economists but it gets my point across. Keynesian economic theory, assuming it was ever valid which I do not, should be seen by now as well past its use-by date and recognised as having become stale and moldy over the past three-quarters of a century. But in the use of this word, it is quite clear that it is the sin and not the sinner being attacked.

Thomas Humphrey has entered into this discussion thread in exactly the right way. A great scholar and one whose writings I admire, he has posted to say that the way Keynesian economic theory has developed since the 1930s has created a macroeconomic theory of immense power and penetration and that my approach would throw baby out with bathwater. And with this, the issues thatI think are important are engaged. And unless there were anything further for me to say on the issue of Keynesian theory and vision, I would have feel there is nothing else to add. I have said my piece. Keynes, yes or no. We report; you decide.

Rob Leeson has now, however, suggested that the moderator not only determine whether something ought to be published depending on its relevance, but also dependant on the choice of words used, on the number of words used and on some determination of the degree of ad hominem involved. I take it that Rob would not therefore have published my posts had he been the moderator which makes me grateful that he is not and Humberto is.

Of course we are all bad judges in our own case but I don’t think any of my posts, nor any of the others on this thread, have been too long. I have read each one through with great interest. And if they are too long, it is only the writer who loses out since eventually others stop reading what they have to say.

The consequences of a centrally-directed free market economy

This is from a note to Henry Ergas on his article, Low interest rates mean more risks for investors:

Another standout column! A centrally-directed free market economy is not the original vision. And I loved your quote from Hume. I don’t know where we are going to go from here, but it is bad news all round. I also have a long-standing fury at low interest rates, but my reasoning goes back to Wicksell. You are right to note how the world has changed and how few people now make the decisions that matter. I do find low interest rates part of the Keynesian insanity since it is supposed to encourage more investment. What gets me is that even the possibility that artificially low interest rates are economically unsound never seems to cross anyone’s mind.

You should read it all, but this is the bit about Hume:

Thanks to interest rates at historic lows, and massive programs of “Quantitative Easing” in the Eurozone and Japan, investors face new, more concentrated, risks. It is no longer millions of consumers, voting with their dollars, who take the decisions that really matter; rather, it is a handful of central bankers.

No doubt, individual consumers are fickle; but their myriad choices, some going one way and others another, have a degree of statistical predictability. Not so those of the “masters of the universe” who will determine just how long the world’s great monetary policy experiment lasts.

As David Hume famously put it, “what depends on a great number, can be accounted for by determinate causes”; but the decisions “of a few persons [must] be ascribed to causes secret and unknown.”

Who and where are the anti-Keynesians?

Below is a letter from Des Moore published in the Financial Review on 29 May. But before I get to the letter itself, let me first reprint the note I sent to Des.

If I assume, as I do, that Y=C+I+G is fundamentally wrong, and that a Keynesian approach to policy is bound to fail, then nothing about the economic problems that have followed the GFC is a surprise. But the questions I would like to ask are two:

1) Who are the leading actively anti-Keynesian economists in the world at the moment, assuming there actually is such a thing?

2) If Keynes is wrong, where should one go to find a more accurate theory of recession and unemployment?

In my view, these are the most important questions in economics at the present time. And I have to tell you that the great surprise to me is that virtually no one has an answer to the first of these questions, although there are some answers to the second.

Kind regards

Where is the locus of anti-Keynesian thought? Who is leading the attack? Des is discussing Robert Skidelsky versus Niall Ferguson, that is, a debate between two historians. Where are the economists? And I have to tell you that however this is resolved, it will not be because of some empirical study based on some dataset. If even at this late date, there is anyone in doubt that the stimulus has been a disaster, there is no turning back from going over the cliff yet again. Unless there is some understanding that existing theory is a deadly fault, that it must be abandoned as a guide to policy, then we will just carry on as before. Here’s the letter sent by Des to the AFR with my further commentary on the other side.

Historian Niall Ferguson argued that the reduction in budget deficits after the 2008-09 UK recession helped improve the growth in GDP while the author of a biography on Keynes, Robert Skidelsky, argued that it reduced it.

These arguments are about hypotheticals and difficult to judge. They are important, however, in the current context faced by Australia and other countries.

Note first that UK growth has recovered to pre-2008 rates after the 2008-09 recession. This has occurred notwithstanding that “underlying balances” (budget deficits) published by the OECD have fallen from 8.5 per cent of GDP in 2009 to an estimated 4.9 per cent in 2015.

Second, Skidelsky does not explain why the large deficits in each of the five years prior to 2008 then resulted in two years of recession.

Third, Skidelsky makes no reference to the policy implications of the increase in government debt levels, which are now over 100 per cent of GDP for major countries, including the UK.

Fourth, in his article published in Australian media in 1932 Keynes himself approved the Premiers Plan to reduce budget deficits. An examination of the recovery from the 1930’s recession shows that Australia performed better than most other countries and that President Roosevelt’s budget stimuli brought a slower recovery in the US.

The solution is to reduce the role of government and increase the opportunities for private enterprises.

I agree, of course, but what’s the theory? What is the foundation on which such advice is given? It’s not just that you should do this and this, but why should you do this and this. That is the issue to me. What disturbs me to a very great extent is that it is an issue that has not, so far as I can tell, been taken up by anyone anywhere.

Real wages are, virtually to their full extent, the product of past labor

Folks, I know no modern economist would think this way, but what worries me more is that I doubt they would even know what he is saying. This is from the great F.W. Taussig in his 1896 Wages and Capital: an Examination of the Wages Fund Doctrine. Moreover, it is from pages 26-27 of a 325-page book where he seeks to dispose of one matter right from the start before getting into any of the more difficult questions. This is mere trivia:

We are now in a position to give an answer to one part of the question with which this chapter opened; whether wages are or are not paid from present or current product. . . . Wages are certainly not paid from the product of present labor; they are paid from the product of past labor. . . . Real wages are, virtually to their full extent, the product of past labor. At this moment, or within a few days, the last touches toward completion have indeed been given to the commodities now being enjoyed. But the great bulk of the labor whose product all of us, whether laborers or idlers, now enjoy, was done in the past.

Our ability to produce is based on our capital base. If we fritter it away on the various value-losing activities that Labor has been indulging in, falling living standards is what you must expect. Labor has been progressively lowering our living standards by allowing our capital base to erode. This from today’s Australian: Joe Hockey’s sales pitch fails to reach the retail counter.

The worst retail sales report in ­almost a year and the biggest foreign trade deficit on record have signalled that Australia’s superior economic performance may be short-lived.

Retail comes at the end of a very long process that modern economic theory not just ignores but virtually denies in everything it preaches. I’m afraid that economic theory will have to go back to the nineteenth century to pick up the lost threads that Keynesian economics has trampled on.

If they’re so smart why are they socialists?

I know what he means, but I wish the Treasurer would save the hubris for more certain times. Still, he does have a point:

Treasurer Joe Hockey has ramped up his criticism of “complete fools” doubting the strength of the nation’s economy as he declared Australia was a “long way off” from a housing bubble burst.

Mr Hockey yesterday slammed economic doomsday sayers as “clowns” after soaring resource exports and the housing boom delivered the best GDP growth in a year.

Asked today who the clowns and fools were, Mr Hockey replied: “You can just have a look around, just have a look around.

A market economy just runs itself if you let it. There’s not nothing to do, but there’s a lot less than our textbooks and regulators seem to understand. We are far from out of troubled times, but the trends so far look good.

AND NOW THAT I HAVE READ THE AFR: They are a bit more negative, like a whole lot more. I’m not a fan of GDP for many reasons – see Chapter 9 – but the adjustment process towards lower real incomes is part of what is required.

“Australia’s living standards are falling on a sustained basis for the first time in 50 years – this is not a short-term trend,” says Andrew Charlton . . . an ex-advisor to former prime minister Kevin Rudd.

How he knows what will turn into a long-term trend from a data point or two I will leave to him. But anyone who thought there would be no aftershocks following the stimulus and the NBN and all of the other useless value-negative projects backed by Labor should really keep their opinions to themselves.

What in economics is known as Say’s Law

There I was just yesterday quoting Kevin Williamson in discussing Economics is quite simple and straightforward when today I find that he has now gone all the way and invoked Say’s Law.

Dollars have value because of the things for which we can trade them: Picasso paintings (or, ideally, paintings by some superior artist), coffee, cotton, cheeseburgers, sofa beds . . . checks, chickens, or pesos. This is an aspect of what in economics is known as Say’s Law, which holds that goods are paid for in goods — i.e., that we manufacture widgets or grow tomatoes or write novels because we wish to consume shoes and poached salmon and Buicks. The dollar or the euro is just a way to avoid the difficulties of trading a truckload of chickens (or a convoy of them) for Les Femmes d’Alger.

Say’s Law really wouldn’t be adding much of a point at all if the only thing it said was that spending is based on selling. What makes it important in a world of Keynesian economics is that it points out that demand which is not based on having produced and sold, ultimately leads to a fall in output and employment. Where spending is greater than available supply, the economy finds there are more than 100 units of output being bought for ever 100 units of output having been produced. It takes a while for the problems to show up, but eventually they must. When those down the expenditure track try to spend the dollars they receive, they find they cannot buy as much as they thought they would. Some firms therefore cannot pay all their bills and the economy slips a bit further back. The wheels of the economy do not mesh, but given the way we teach macro, hardly one in a million can understand why. Indeed, the worse our economies perform, it is often the very businesses being cheated by these deficits which ask governments for even more of the same to get them out of the problems that the first set of deficits had caused.

Modern economics is based on the fallacy that demand can be manufactured before there is production to match the spending. You can see that such policies do not work by the dismal state of those economies which tried deficit spending to generate growth. You just cannot find these policy failures explained in any of our economics texts, other than, of course, my own.

[My thanks to Dimitri for sending the link along.]