Annette has passed on as well

The older you get the more the world thins out of those who were there when it was all new and fresh. Annette – no last names on the Mickey Mouse Club – has passed away at 70. She must obviously have become old:

Her family confirmed to ‘Extra’ that Funicello died from complications of multiple sclerosis. They were by her side at a Bakersfield hospital when she was taken off life support. Funicello had been in an MS coma for years.

Black and white TV and only four channels to watch. Didn’t seem so bad at the time, as I recall.

How to manage an economy

keynesian broken glass

It is becoming more apparent that modern macro with its Keynesian Y=C+I+G is utterly defective to the point of vacuity but the problem remains what ought to replace it? Here is my formula in brief:

1) never use variations in aggregate demand to explain anything
2) recognise that growth is driven by value adding production alone
3) the structure of production is the core concept in understanding how an economy works – even aggregate supply is a near on useless concept
4) government spending after perhaps the first 10% is never value adding
5) only businesses subject to the disciplines of profit and loss can be expected to create value
6) government subsidies to business do not create faster growth or more employment
7) recessions are inevitable
8) recessions can never be cured by higher levels of public spending.

Want more? See my Free Market Economics: an Introduction for the General Reader.

History of economics comes to TV

I shall fortify myself for the ordeal but tonight at 9:30 on SBS:

John Maynard and Keynesianism – BBC economics editor Stephanie Flanders examines how three extraordinary thinkers, Keynes, Hayek and Marx, helped shape the 20th century. John Maynard Keynes was the first economist to become a global celebrity. He made his name during the worst economic crisis the world had seen, the Great Depression. His theory that only government spending could kick-start a depressed economy was controversial, but recently both the US and UK governments have pumped money into their stuttering economies.

We have seen how well government spending has been at kick starting our economies but I shall look on with interest. Good to see some recognition of the importance of the history of economic thought.

The errors of Keynes’s critics

I was pointed in the direction of this article at Mises.org on “The Errors of Keynes” by Philipp Bagus. It is a review of a book written in Spanish by Juan Ramón Rallo and titled, Los Errores de la Vieja Economía part of which deals with Say’s Law.

The really interesting part is that it is becoming better understood that the road to unwind Keynesian economics travels through Say’s Law. Keynes himself could not have been clearer on this, that he was reversing the conclusion of those who believed Say’s Law to be true. Thus, there are two things that need to be done. First you have to know what Say’s Law is. Then you then have to show it is valid.

But the problem, and it is such a massive obstacle that it gets in the way of many such attempts, is that all economists are brought up on Keynesian demand side theory and it infuses every aspect of their thought. Even while recognising that it is the structure of demand that is the key they still hang onto the level of demand as an integral part of how they approach economic problems.

Let me therefore put it this way. If one is to understand the classical theory of the cycle, this is what one must know in one’s very bones. Hoarding NEVER causes a recession. Too much saving is NEVER the problem. An economy NEVER suffers from demand deficiency. If you want to say that after a recession begins people become tentative because of a lack of confidence, this you can find absolutely everywhere on the classical side of the Keynes-classics divide. .

Here is the reviewer’s discussion of Say’s Law.

Let’s have a look of some of Rallo’s arguments, beginning with Keynes’s famous critique of Say’s Law. Keynes’s distorted version of Say’s Law in TGT states that supply creates its own demand. Rallo vindicates Say’s Law in its original version: In the long run, the supply of a good adjusts to its demand. Ultimately, goods are offered to buy other goods (money included). One produces in order to demand, which implies that a general overproduction is impossible [in the long run].

Say’s Laws leads us straight forward to the most innovative argument in Rallo’s book that addresses the old argument against hoarding. Even harsh critics of Keynes, for example from the monetarist or neoclassical camp, admit that Keynes was at least right in that hoarding is a destabilizing and dangerous activity.

Rallo, however, proves and emphasizes the social function of hoarding. To demand money is not to demand nothing from the market. Hoarding is the natural response of savers and consumers to a structure of production that does not adjust to their needs. It is a signal of protest to entrepreneurs: ‘Please offer different consumer and capital goods! Change the structure of production, since the composition of offered goods is not appropriate.’ (My bolding and my additional text in square brackets)

This is how he controverts Keynes by confirming everything he wrote. People really do hoard, Rallo argues, store money rather than spend. There really is a deficiency of demand in the short to medium term which may finally work itself out in the long run, eventually, in five to ten years perhaps. Overproduction is impossible but only ultimately. Involuntary unemployment does apparently occur because of some problem on the demand side of the economy due to hoarding cash. However, rather than this deficiency of demand being a bad thing, it’s a good thing since the hoarding allows business to think about what to do next. But if you are Krugman, it also allows the government to come to the rescue with a stimulus package that will short circuit this delay. Here is the example Rallo uses of how hoarding can work:

In a situation of great uncertainty, it is even prudent to hoard and not immobilize funds for the long run. Rallo provides us a visual example. Let’s assume that uncertainty increases because people expect an earthquake. They start to hoard, i.e., they increase their cash balance, which gives them more flexibility. This is completely rational and beneficial from the point of view of market participants. The alternative is to immobilize funds through government spending. The public production of skyscrapers is not only against the will of the more prudent people; it will also prove disastrous if the earthquake is realized.

A government should not build skyscrapers when everyone expects an earthquake! But if the economy has gone quiet and there are useful things a government can do – perhaps reinforcing existing buildings – why wouldn’t that make sense? I’m afraid it’s a metaphor that doesn’t necessarily make sense and certainly won’t explain why Keynes is wrong and would never convince a Keynesian.

So let me get to the problem as expressed in this para in the review:

As Rallo points out in contrast to TGT, it is not aggregate supply or aggregate demand that is important, but their composition. If, in a depression with a distorted structure of production, in a liquidity trap situation, aggregate demand is boosted by government spending, the existing structure cannot produce the goods that consumers want most urgently. The solution is not more spending and more debts, but debt reduction and the liquidation of malinvestments to make new and sustainable investments feasible. (My bolding)

I can certainly agree with that the solution is to leave recovery to the private sector as they find their way towards profitable outcomes. But to use “aggregate demand” in the same sentence as “structure of production” must leave the argument confused. Even more certainly, to include mention of “a liquidity trap” will bar entry to the classical world. Demand is constituted by supply: supply is demand. Aggregate demand and aggregate supply are not two separate entities. There is no such thing as an independent force that can be described as aggregate demand.

If you want to get to the essence of Say’s Law you must NEVER think in terms of aggregate demand. Just drop it from all conceptual discussions of the economy and I think, although I can’t be sure, you will find yourself necessarily thinking about issues in the same way as the classics. If you want to defeat Keynesian economics, you need to wage war on the idea of aggregate demand. Nothing else will do.

So God made an entrepreneur

This is the number one Superbowl ad which extols the virtues of a farming life. But if you watch it, which is quite an extraordinary piece of craftsmanship, what it is really extolling is the ethic that applies across the board to all forms of business. There is a sentiment about farmers, perhaps, but the same as is said here could be said about anyone who is trying to keep a business together in the heart of the city. But if they ran an ad about how hard it is to make a living by employing others in a business enterprise you would not get the same response, not by a long chalk.

The greatest spy novelist of them all

This may be the one time I have really regretted not being able to read French. A story from The New York Times Magazine about the greatest spy novelist of them all, a man by name of Gérard de Villiers. This is the first para and if it doesn’t get you in then don’t bother with the rest:

Last June, a pulp-fiction thriller was published in Paris under the title Le Chemin de Damas. Its lurid green-and-black cover featured a busty woman clutching a pistol, and its plot included the requisite car chases, explosions and sexual conquests. Unlike most paperbacks, though, this one attracted the attention of intelligence officers and diplomats on three continents. Set in the midst of Syria’s civil war, the book offered vivid character sketches of that country’s embattled ruler, Bashar al-Assad, and his brother Maher, along with several little-known lieutenants and allies. It detailed a botched coup attempt secretly supported by the American and Israeli intelligence agencies. And most striking of all, it described an attack on one of the Syrian regime’s command centers, near the presidential palace in Damascus, a month before an attack in the same place killed several of the regime’s top figures. ‘It was prophetic,’ I was told by one veteran Middle East analyst who knows Syria well and preferred to remain nameless. ‘It really gave you a sense of the atmosphere inside the regime, of the way these people operate, in a way I hadn’t seen before.’