If the intelligent design issue interests you, there’s a debate at The American Spectator between Stephen Meyer and John Derbyshire that you might have a look at. Meyer is at the centre of this issue on the ID side. Derbyshire is a science man who thinks that whatever a scientific community concludes is the best possible answer you can have at any moment in time.

First there’s Steve Meyer. This is typical of the approach he takes:

In Darwin’s Doubt, I show that the number of possible DNA and amino acid sequences that need to be searched by the evolutionary process dwarfs the time available for such a search—even taking into account evolutionary deep time. Molecular biologists have long understood that the size of the ‘sequence space’ of possible nucleotide bases and amino acids (the number of possible combinations) is extremely large. Moreover, recent experiments in molecular biology and protein science have established that functional genes and proteins are extremely rare within these huge combinatorial spaces of possible arrangements. There are vastly more ways of arranging nucleotide bases that result in non-functional sequences of DNA, and vastly more ways of arranging amino acids that result in non-functional amino-acid chains, than there are corresponding functionalgenes or proteins. One recent experimentally derived estimate places that ratio—the size of the haystack in relation to the needle—at 1077non-functional sequences for every functional gene or protein. (There are only something like 1065 atoms in our galaxy.)

And this is from Derbyshire who is not a frontline biologist but then none of them will enter into such debates. And while he is on the nay side of this debate, after quite a bit of skirting around the issue, if you ask me, he seems to concede the main point. I would say that he has gone a long way from what he might originally have hoped to conclude:

The problem of Mind has vexed philosophers for at least as long as the Demarcation Problem. Is Mind a part of nature, or outside nature? Since the only minds we know of are intimately attached to brains—organs with a fairly well-understood phylogeny and ontogeny—it seems that a naturalistic explanation of Mind ought to be forthcoming, but no-one has come up with one that has received general acceptance.

So the question is open, and for all we know it may be that Mind is outside nature. In that case, the kinds of interactions between Mind and nature that ID talks about can’t be ruled out.

“Mind is outside nature” practically concedes the entire ground. Thomas Nagel, atheist and man of the philosophical left if ever there’s been one, in his Mind and Cosmos has almost on his own made the notion of a separate creation of our independent minds a respectable point of view which Derbyshire mirrors in his own presentation.